Browder v. Gayle

LYNNE, District Judge

(dissenting).

Only a profound, philosophical disagreement with the ultimate conclusion of the majority “that the separate but equal doctrine can no longer be safely followed as a correct statement of the law” would prompt this, my first dissent. But I should consider myself recreant both to conscience and duty in withhold *718 ing my views because of the affection and esteem which I bear for my associates.

For many years as a trial judge in the state and federal systems I have endeavored faithfully to understand and apply precedents established by the opinions of appellate courts. This was not a blind obedience to a legalistic formula embodied in the rule of stare decisis. It was the result of a simple belief that the laws which regulate the conduct, the affairs, and sometimes the emotions of our people should evidence not only the appearance but also the spirit of stability.

Judges of trial courts frequently find themselves in disagreement with the rationale of an old, but clearly controlling precedent. That is so because their positions do not insulate them from those changing physical and metaphysical concepts which form a part of the life process. But they are neither designed nor equipped to perform the legislative function of putting off the old and putting on the new. To arrogate to themselves this prerogative, in my humble opinion, would be the first, fatal step in making hollow the proud boast that ours is a “government of laws and not of men.”

Judge Rives, just the other day, delivering the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, in Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274, 275 , stated my position, clearly and concisely:

“In the face of such recognition by the Supreme Court of a test of criminal responsibility, we do not feel at liberty to consider and decide whether in our opinion the recent modification of such test in the District of Columbia is sound or unsound, nor whether some other test should be adopted. This Circuit follows the law as stated by the Supreme Court and leaves any need for modification thereof to that Court. * * * » (Emphasis supplied.)

The majority recognize, it was conceded in oral arguments by counsel for plaintiffs, that Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896, 163 U.S. 537 , 16 S.Ct. 1138 , 41 L.Ed. 256 , is precisely in point, and that its holding has been repeatedly followed in later transportation cases. 1 Its authority obviously was unaffected by the action of the Supreme Court in dismissing the appeal in South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Flemming, 351 U.S. 901 , 76 S.Ct. 692 . The citation of Slaker v. O’Connor, 278 U.S. 188 , 49 S.Ct. 158 , 73 L.Ed. 258 , is convincing that it did not place the stamp of its approval upon the decision of the Fourth Circuit in Flemming v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 , but simply concluded that its judgment was not final and hence that the appeal did not lie. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1254 (2).

In complete agreement with the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Flemming that the separate but equal doctrine can no longer be safely followed as a correct statement of the law, the majority conclude that Plessy v. Ferguson, in which that doctrine made its first appearance sixty years ago, has been impliedly, though not explicitly overruled. While I share their great respect for Judges Parker, Soper and Dobie, I do not at all agree.

A comparatively new principle of pernicious implications has found its way into our jurisprudence. 2 Lower courts may feel free to disregard the precise precedent of a Supreme Court opinion if they perceive a “pronounced new doctrinal trend” in its later decisions which would influence a cautious judge to prophesy that in due time and in a proper *719 case such established precedent will be overturned explicitly. Peculiarly appropriate in this context is the following language of Judge Woodbury, writing for the First Circuit in New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Welch, 153 F.2d 260 , 262:

“Furthermore we find no indication from anything said therein of a purpose to depart from the rule of the earlier decisions cited above. Under these circumstances we see no occasion even to consider the basic question whether we would adopt the doctrine of Barnette v. West Virginia State Board of Education, D.C., 47 F.Supp. 251, 253 , and Spector Motor Service v. Walsh, 2 Cir., 139 F.2d 809, 817, 823 , and in extraordinary situations disregard controlling decisions of the Supreme Court not yet explicitly overruled. It will suffice to say that we would feel disposed to consider taking such a course only when there are the clearest indications that the controlling decision of the Supreme Court, though not formally overruled, would no longer be followed by that Court and we find no such indications here.”

In 1950, the Fourth Circuit had before it the case of Boyer v. Garrett, 183 F.2d 582 , involving an officially adopted rule providing for the segregation of races in athletic activities in the public parks and playgrounds in the City of Baltimore. In affirming the judgment of the District Court, the same judges who decided Flemming held:

“The contention of plaintiffs is that, notwithstanding this equality of treatment, the rule providing for segregation is violative of the provisions of the federal Constitution. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the authority of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 , 16 S.Ct. 1138 , 41 L.Ed. 256 ; and the principal argument made on appeal is that -the authority of Plessy v. Ferguson has been so weakened by subsequent decisions that we should no longer consider it as binding. We do not think, however, that we are at liberty thus to disregard a decision of the Supreme Court which that court has not seen fit to overrule and which it expressly refrained from reexamining, although urged to do so, in the very recent case of Sweatt v. Painter, [ 339 U.S. 629 ] 70 S.Ct. 848 [ 94 L.Ed. 1114 ]. It is for the Supreme Court, not us, to overrule its decisions or to hold them outmoded.”

In 1955, in Flemming, an intrastate transportation case, reversing the district judge, the court wrote:

“We do not think that the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, can any longer be regarded as a correct statement of the law. That case recognizes segregation of the races by common carriers as being governed by the same principles as segregation in the public schools; and the recent decisions in Brown v. Board of Education [of Topeka], 347 U.S. 483 , 74 S.Ct. 686 , 98 L.Ed. 873 and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 , 74 S.Ct. 693 , 98 L.Ed. 884 , which relate to public schools, leave no doubt that the separate but equal doctrine approved in Plessy v. Ferguson has been repudiated. That the principle- applied in the school cases should be applied in cases involving transportation, appears quite clearly from the recent case of Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 , 70 S.Ct. 843 , 94 L.Ed. 1302 , where segregation in dining cars was held violative of a section of the interstate commerce act providing against discrimination.”

Within this five year interval the Supreme Court had spoken pertinently but once, in the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 , 74 S.Ct. 686 , 98 L.Ed. 873 , since Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 , 74 S.Ct. 693 , 98 L.Ed. 884 , did not discuss Plessy v. Ferguson and appears to have been decided on a parity of reasoning. My study of Brown has convinced me that it left unimpaired the “ ‘separate but equal’ ” [ 347 U.S. 483 , 74 S.Ct. 688 ] doctrine in a *720 local transportation case and I perceive no pronounced new doctrinal trend therein.

Of course I appreciate the care with which the Supreme Court limits its pronouncements upon great constitutional questions to the narrow issues before it and the only issue in Brown involved a collision between the Fourteenth Amendment and state laws commanding segregation in the public schools. But in Brown the Court’s opinion referred to Plessy v. Ferguson six times and to its “ ‘separate but equal’ ” doctrine on four occasions. It epitomized its concept of that doctrine as follows: “Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate.” Its ultimate conclusion was, and this I conceive to be the rationale of its decision, “that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has. no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”

It seems to me that the Supreme Court therein recognized that there still remains an area within our constitutional scheme of state and federal governments wherein that doctrine may be applied even though its applications are always constitutionally suspect and for sixty years it may have been more honored in the breach than in the observance. Granted that the trend of its opinions is to the effect that segregation is not to be permitted in public facilities furnished by the state itself and the moneys of the state, as in the case of public schools, or public parks, cf. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Association, 347 U.S. 971 , 74 S.Ct. 783 , 98 L.Ed. 1112 ; Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 4 Cir., 220 F.2d 386 , affirmed 350 U.S. 877 , 76 S.Ct. 133 , or municipal golf courses, cf. Rice v. Arnold, 340 U.S. 848 , 71 S.Ct. 77 , 95 L.Ed. 621 ; Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 , 76 S.Ct. 141 , on the plain theory that if the state is going to provide such facilities at all, it must provide them equally to the citizens, it does not follow that it may not be permitted in public utilities holding nonexclusive franchises.

If that doctrine has any vitality, this is such a case in which it has been applied fairly. According to its teaching not absolute, but substantial equality is required. Such equality is not a question of dogma, but one of fact. Under the undisputed evidence adduced upon the hearing before us practices under the laws here attacked have resulted in providing the races not only substantially equal but in truth identical facilities.

In my opinion the holding of the Court in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 , 66 S.Ct. 1050 , 90 L.Ed. 1317 , that the attempt of a state to require the segregation of passengers on interstate buses results in the imposition of an undue burden on interstate commerce is wholly irrelevant to the issue before us. And equally inapposite is reference to Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 , 70 S. Ct. 843, 844 , 94 L.Ed. 1302 which held that rules and practices of interstate railroad carriers requiring the segregation of passengers in dining cars were offensive to Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act making it unlawful for a railroad in interstate commerce “ ‘to subject any particular person, * * * to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever: * « * »»

The supremacy of the federal government in matters affecting interstate commerce is axiomatic. Cases involving the exercise of its power in that realm shed no light on Fourteenth Amendment problems. It does seem quite clear that by its terms the Congress is given the power and duty to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by legislation. Thus the Congress would have the power, thus derived, to proscribe segregation in intrastate transportation. It is worthy of note that for sixty years it has not seen fit to do so.

While any student of history knows that under our system of government vindication of the constitutional rights of the individual is not, and ought not to be, entrusted to the Congress, its ret *721 icence to intrude upon the internal affairs of the several states should caution us against doing so where the path of duty is not plainly marked and when we must hold a clear precedent of the Supreme Court outmoded.

Because I would dismiss the action on the authority of Plessy v. Ferguson, I do not reach the procedural questions discussed in the majority opinion. I respectfully dissent.

. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 1900, 179 U.S. 388 , 21 S.Ct. 101 , 45 L.Ed. 244 ; Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 1910, 218 U.S. 71 , 30 S.Ct. 667 , 54 L.Ed. 936 ; McCabe v. Atchison, T & S. F. Ry. Co., 1914, 235 U.S. 151 , 35 S.Ct. 69 , 59 L.Ed. 169 .

. Barnette v. West Virginia State Board of Education, D.C.1942, 47 F.Supp. 251 ; Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corporation, 2 Cir., 1942, 128 F.2d 208 ; Spector Motor Service v. Walsh, 2 Cir., 1943, 139 F.2d 809 ; Gardella v. Chandler, 2 Cir., 1949, 172 F.2d 402, 409 ; United States v. Ullmann, 2 Cir., 1955, 221 F.2d 760 ; United States v. Girouard, 1 Cir., 1945, 149 F.2d 760 ; 50 Yale Law Journal 1448.