explaining that an excited utterance is a "spontaneous declaration” made by a person whose mind has been "suddenly made subject to an overpowering emotion”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that an excited utterance is a "spontaneous declaration” made by a person whose mind has been "suddenly made subject to an overpowering emotion”
- determining that “the fact that appellant’s mother was upset with him is as indicative of concern as it is of disinterest.”
- juvenile validly waived his Miranda rights, even if mother who met with juvenile prior to waiver was angry with juvenile and only met with juvenile for a few minutes; fact that mother was angry was as indicative of concern as it was of disinterest
- defendant, inter alia, “discussed and planned the robbery with [his] co-defendants for up to a half-hour”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STEVENS, Judge,
dissenting and concurring:
The majority opinion concludes that the exculpatory requirement of the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule is no longer vital, and, therefore, the majority concludes that the trial court erred in excluding certain hearsay statements on this basis. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s analysis as to those portions of the statement which are not exculpatory, but I agree with the majority’s analysis as to those portions which are exculpatory.
In Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa.Super. 22 , 307 A.2d 334 (1973), our Court stated that declarations against penal interest are not admissible unless (1) they exculpate the defendant from the crime for which he is charged and (2) they are inherently trustworthy. In the within matter, at issue is whether certain portions of Appellant’s co-defendant’s statement are admissible since they did not exculpate Appellant. The majority questions the continued vitality of the exculpatory requirement, alleging that “the only case to address the exculpatory requirement [since Hackett, supra] is Commonwealth v. Robinson, 298 Pa.Super. 447 , 444 A.2d 1260 (1982).” I disagree.
In Commonwealth v. Presbury, 445 Pa.Super. 362 , 665 A.2d 825 (1995), a panel of this Court expressly followed the dictates of Hackett, swpra, and concluded that Appellant was required to show that the statement he wished to introduced under the penal interest exception exculpated him. Since a necessary transcript was not provided to the panel, the panel was unable to review Appellant’s claim under the mandates of Hackett, supra. However, there is no doubt that the panel concluded that fulfillment of the exculpatory *1164 prong was a necessary prerequisite to the introduction of the statement.
Not only does the exculpatory requirement remain vital; it is an important prerequisite to the introduction of out-of-court statements introduced under the declaration against penal interest exception. Those statements which do not exculpate a defendant are irrelevant, i.e., they do not tend to make it more likely than not that the defendant did not commit the crime. See Commonwealth v. Pompey, 248 Pa.Super. 410 , 375 A.2d 163 (1977). Further, contrary to the majority’s assertion, those portions of a statement which do not contain exculpatory information must be excluded. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court with regard to those portions of the statement which are not exculpatory, but I would remand for a hearing with regard to those portions of the statement which are exculpatory.