concluding that main catalysts for drafting new constitution were state's financial woes and desire to limit General Assembly's ability to enact special laws dealing with local matters
How later courts described this case
- concluding that main catalysts for drafting new constitution were state's financial woes and desire to limit General Assembly's ability to enact special laws dealing with local matters
- upholding riverboat gambling statute that provided for voting by city — rather than by county — for Lake County alone because its “waterfront is covered by substantial cities”
- upholding riverboat gambling statute that provided for voting by city rather than by county for Lake County alone because of the unique circumstances of its waterfront
- if the subject matter of a legislative act is not amenable to a general law of uniform operation throughout the state, then the act is constitutional under section 23
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GIVAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. I would hold that the trial court was correct in holding ILC. § 4-33-G6~1, et seq. unconstitutional.
As pointed out by the majority opinion, there are many reasons why laws that affect only a certain part of the state do not in reality violate the constitutional prohibition against special laws. In the instant case, the majority is correct in observing that the statute is not unconstitutional because it affects only those counties and cities where the use of a riverboat is possible.
However, when such a law is passed, although it does not affect every county in the state in like manner, it must apply equally to those counties affected. R.R. Comm. of Ind. v. Grand Trunk Western, R. Co. (1913), 179 Ind. 255 , 100 N.E. 852 . The provision in the statute that there must be a county-wide referendum in most of the counties affected is most reasonable and quite understandable considering the fact that the presence of a riverboat casino in a county will have county wide ramifications even though it would be docked within the corporate limits of a city within the county.
It is obvious that not only the city but the county will be required to make accommodations for the increase in traffic and the anticipated incidents which will necessitate countywide law enforcement. Anticipated criminal prosecutions which will result from the presence of the riverboat will necessitate an expenditure of taxpayers' funds on a countywide basis. To make an exception of Lake County as to the need for a county-wide referendum is not logical merely because the entire lake front in Lake County is within the corporate limits of cities within the county. This in no way diminishes the cost to the taxpayers county wide in carrying out those governmental functions which will naturally evolve from the presence of the riverboat.
I find no justification in treating the taxpayers of Lake County any differently than the taxpayers of the other counties involved. For the same reasons, I see no justification in treating the City of Gary in a different manner than the other cities in Lake County are treated.
The trial court was correct in declaring the statute to be unconstitutional.