reversing exclusion of expert witness whose testimony would have impeached the state’s key eyewitnesses
How later courts described this case
- reversing exclusion of expert witness whose testimony would have impeached the state’s key eyewitnesses
- exclusion only justifiable if the discovery violation is deliberate
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE KARNS, dissenting:
The wisdom of requiring compliance with section 116 — 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 116 — 1) is forcefully illustrated by this case. This section requires that the motion for a new trial specify the grounds therefor. Failure to specify the issue in the written motion constitutes a waiver of that issue and precludes the defendant from assigning the matter on appeal as grounds for reversal. The rule applies to constitutional questions as well as other procedural or substantive matters. (People v. Pickett, 54 Ill. 2d 280 , 296 N.E.2d 856 (1973).) While “plain error” may be recognized (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 615(a)), although the error complained of was not specified in the motion for a new trial, it is preferable that the matter be brought to the attention of the trial court for its ruling. Correction by the trial court may obviate the need for review. Often the error complained of is not clear from the record and correction by the trial court or clarification of what transpired during trial is necessary to assist the reviewing court in considering the matter complained of with any degree of intelligence.
As I read the record in this case, the trial court never refused to allow the defense to call Deputy Price as a witness. In the colloquy between the state’s attorney and defense counsel discussed in the majority opinion, the state’s attorney stated in concluding his objection to Price being allowed to testify that the only reason defense counsel wanted to call Chief Deputy Price as a witness was to make it appear before the jury that law enforcement officers “are in favor of the defendant.” The court replied, “If that is what it is going to be, the objection is going to be sustained.” There was no further discussion of Price and no ruling was made. Only one brief reference to Price is contained in the lengthy report of proceedings following. Price was never tendered as a witness; the court never ruled that he could not testify to material, competent matters. No mention of Price is made in the motion for a new trial.
It seems apparent that the defendant abandoned his efforts to call Price as a witness for the obvious reason that any competent testimony he could provide would have been of little probative value.
I would affirm the judgment of conviction.