expanding prior case law that presumed loss-of-companionship damages upon death of minor child, Illinois Supreme Court recognized presumption that pecuniary loss includes loss-of-companionship damages upon wrongful death of an adult child
How later courts described this case
- expanding prior case law that presumed loss-of-companionship damages upon death of minor child, Illinois Supreme Court recognized presumption that pecuniary loss includes loss-of-companionship damages upon wrongful death of an adult child
- holding that evidence of prior occurrences may be admissible to establish the dangerousness of a product
- finding good faith settlement although settling defendant could have raised statute of limitations as an absolute affirmative defense
- where the defendant boat manufacturer argued that the sole proximate cause of the boaters’ deaths was the conduct of the person piloting the boat when it struck the overhead power lines, and the conduct of the city, which maintained the power lines in a dangerous condition
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE MORAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority’s opinion as to most of the issues in this case. However, I cannot agree that it was proper to omit the second paragraph of Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 12.04 (2d ed. 1971) (IPI Civil No. 12.04).
The evidence was clear that the all-metal construction of the boat was one of the causes of decedent’s electrocution, i.e., decedent would not have been electrocuted but for the boat’s design. Therefore, the majority concludes, the second paragraph was properly omitted. However, the second paragraph of IPI Civil No. 12.04 is to be given only when there is evidence that the conduct of a third party was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Conduct which is not negligent cannot be a proximate cause of an injury even if it is a cause in the “but-for” sense. Although this court has never specifically addressed the issue, the appellate court has held that the second paragraph of IPI Civil No. 12.04 should be given whenever the evidence is such that the jury could find either (1) that the defendant’s negligent conduct was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, or (2) that the defendant’s conduct was not negligent at all. Schmidt v. Blackwell (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 190, 195-96 ; Storm v. Brown (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 29, 33 .
In this case defendant offered evidence which tended to show that the design of the boat, while dangerous in this situation, was not unreasonably dangerous given the standards of the industry, the possible alternative designs, and the probability that an accident such as the one here involved would occur. There was also substantial evidence that the conduct of Philip Henrici and the city of Springfield were proximate causes of decedent’s death. The jury could have found that defendant was not negligent and that either Henrici’s or the city of Springfield’s negligence, or both, constituted the sole proximate cause of the decedent’s electrocution. Therefore I agree with the appellate court that the second paragraph of IPI Civil No. 12.04 should have been given.
JUSTICE RYAN joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.