indicating that a former patient who brought claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against an unregistered psychologist was not required to allege that she suffered physical injury or illness as a result of emotional distress she experienced when he repeatedly engaged in sexual intercourse with her under the guise of therapy
How later courts described this case
- indicating that a former patient who brought claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against an unregistered psychologist was not required to allege that she suffered physical injury or illness as a result of emotional distress she experienced when he repeatedly engaged in sexual intercourse with her under the guise of therapy
- holding, in a psychotherapy malpractice case, that plaintiff could recover for emotional distress resulting from sexual relations which resulted in no physical injury
- recognizing that the “nature of the therapist-patient relationship gives rise to a duty ... to refrain from ... causing emotional or mental harm to the patient”
- holding that complaint stated cause of action for negligence arising from psychologist's engaging in relations with plaintiff during course of treatment
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Harms v. Laboratory Corp. of America, 155 F. Supp. 2d 891 (2001)
158 Ill.Dec. 489, 574 N.E.2d at 605-06 (holding that the “zone-of-physical-danger” rule is inapplicable to direct victims).
The opinion
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
This is a malpractice case against an unlicensed clinical psychologist. The gist of the malpractice claim is that during the so-called course of treatment, a sexual relationship developed between the “patient” and the “psychologist.” The “treatment” began in March of 1979 and continued until October of 1980. During this period of time, the plaintiff and the defendant repeatedly engaged in mutually agreeable sexual intercourse. The plaintiff now claims that this sexual relationship disturbed her psychological well-being. She would like the defendant to pay her damages of $3.75 million.
This is not a proper claim for malpractice. It should not be recognized in law. There is no suggestion that the plaintiff in this case was a minor, was mentally retarded or was under any other legal disability. She knew what she was doing and did it.
At the moment the sexual relationship began, the treatment relationship ended. From that time forward, the plaintiff and the defendant were engaged in a frolic, a mutually agreeable detour from any recognized or accepted treatment regimen. To hold the defendant legally liable under such conditions is to countenance a legal form of extortion or blackmail. The law should not permit it. The complaint should be dismissed. Even if such a claim were to be recognized, the attempt to fit this type of claim into a negligence or willful and wanton format is wholly misplaced. There is no allegation that the parties fell off a bed or injured any part of the plaintiff’s anatomy. The plaintiff, having willingly engaged in a frolic, now seeks to use the legal system as a tool for a shakedown.
Accordingly, I dissent.