holding that “[w]hen . . . a plaintiff sustains a direct impact by the negligence of another and, by virtue of that direct involvement sustains an emotional trauma which is serious in nature and of a kind and extent normally expected to occur in a reasonable person, . . . such a plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action to recover for that emotional trauma without regard to whether the emotional trauma arises out of or accompanies any physical injury to the plaintiff”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “[w]hen . . . a plaintiff sustains a direct impact by the negligence of another and, by virtue of that direct involvement sustains an emotional trauma which is serious in nature and of a kind and extent normally expected to occur in a reasonable person, . . . such a plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action to recover for that emotional trauma without regard to whether the emotional trauma arises out of or accompanies any physical injury to the plaintiff”
- holding that ”[w]hen ... a plaintiff sustains a direct impact by the negligence of another and, by virtue of that direct involvement sustains emotional trauma which is serious in nature and of a kind and extent normally expected to occur in a reasonable person, ... such a plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action to recover for that emotional trauma without regard to whether the emotional trauma arises out of or accompanies any physical injury to the plaintiff”
- holding a plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress where she “sustains a direct impact by the negligence of another and, by virtue of that direct involvement sustains an emotional trauma which is serious in nature and of a kind and extent normally expected to occur in a reasonable person”
- holding that a plaintiff who heard pounding on the door, which resulted in alleged emotional distress, could not maintain an action under the doctrine of negligent infliction of emotional distress because plaintiff did not sustain a direct physical impact
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Groves v. Taylor, 2000 Ind. LEXIS 535 (2000)
Co. v. Tozer, 392 F.3d 950, 954 (7th Cir.2004) (recognizing that Shuamber was overruled by Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 573 (Ind.2000)), and refined by more recent Indiana Supreme Court decisions.
The opinion
ON CIVIL PETITION TO TRANSFER
GIVAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case.
The majority correctly states that for many years the law in Indiana precluded recovery for emotional injury due to the loss of a loved one. The Court of Appeals opinion, Shuamber v. Henderson (1990), Ind.App., 563 N.E.2d 1314 , also correctly states this proposition of law.
Although the majority is correct in stating that the impact rule is part of the case law of Indiana, thus subject to change by the judiciary, this nevertheless is a field which, as recognized by the majority opinion, has been entered by the legislature.
The majority goes on to state that this Court should change the rule "when the rationale for the rule is no longer valid." However, I see no rationalization within the majority opinion which demonstrates any factual changes in our society which would render the rule "no longer valid." As recognized by the majority, the reason for the rule in the first place is that emotional trauma, under the circumstances of this case, although without doubt existing, is so nebulous and differing from person to person that the fixing of damages by a jury can only be a wild guess and thus subject to extreme variations from case to case.
If the legislature would see fit to provide for such damages, so be it. I find no justification however in the majority opinion for this Court to create such a remedy.
The trial court should be affirmed.