The opinion
HOFFMAN, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Since all the statutory requirements were met and it was in the best interests of B.C., the trial court was correct in terminating the parental rights of L.C.
IC 1971, 31-6-5 — 4 (Burns 1980 Repl.) provides:
“Termination of parent-child relationship involving delinquent child or child in need of services. — A petition to terminate the parent-child relationship involving a delinquent child or a child in need of services may be signed and filed with the juvenile court only by the attorney for the county department or the prosecutor; that person shall represent the interests of the state in all subsequent proceedings on the petition. The petition shall be entitled ‘In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of -, a child, and_, his parent (or parents)’ and must allege that:
(1) The child has been removed from his parent for at least six [6] months under a dispositional decree;
(2) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in his removal will not be remedied;
*23 (3) Reasonable services have been offered or provided to the parent to assist him in fulfilling his parental obligations, and either he has failed to accept them or they have been ineffective;
(4) Termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(5) The county department has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.” (Emphasis added.)
The majority contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the removal of B.C. from L.C. would not be remedied. In essence, they contend that because the trial court did not have any medical evidence concerning L.C.’s mental condition, it could not make the proper determinations.
I disagree. The trial court as trier of fact was completely capable of determining whether there was a reasonable probability that the conditions would not be remedied without hearing evidence from any medical expert. In fact, had it heard testimony from a psychiatrist which indicated L.C.’s mental condition would be changed, the trial court could still have reached the opposite conclusion.
It was only necessary for the trial court to find that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal will not be remedied. The trial court had a period of almost two years to examine L.C.’s actions, from the time she gave her child to strangers in the department store parking lot until the time her parental rights were terminated.
There was evidence that she had been given the type of medication which the majority heralds in their opinion, yet she did not follow through with it. When a home was found for her after her release from the hospital, she stayed a few days and then left, which caused great difficulty for those trying to locate her. In order to alleviate these problems following a subsequent discharge from the hospital, L.C. was placed on medication that was given by injection every two weeks, so she would not have to depend on taking a daily dosage. She was also placed in a structured living situation, a group home. This was accomplished after some difficulty because other half-way houses refused her due to her lack of cooperation with them in the past.
While there was testimony at the October 26, 1979 hearing that L.C. was improving with the medication, that improvement must have been short-lived, because on November 7, 1979, L.C. was committed to the Richmond State Hospital.
L.C. did not follow the casework plan set up for her by the Welfare Department. In fact she would refuse to discuss it, storm out of its offices, fail to respond to its letters, and. go for months without informing the Welfare Department of her whereabouts. In addition, she refused visitation with B.C.
Throughout the months that the trial court held proceedings, L.C. resided in temporary housing situations, when she was not hospitalized. Her employment was extremely sporadic. The few jobs she had lasted no more than a few days, and she contributed no financial support for her child.
The evidence before the trial court was perhaps best summarized in a statement made during cross-examination by one of the Welfare Department caseworkers who had handled this matter from the outset:
“I see nothing in her history that would indicate that she will attain any degree of stability. The only stability that I have ever seen her — in her, as far as her emotional self, is while she was hospitalized. Those times when she has not been hospitalized, she has failed to take her medication, she has failed to maintain a place to live, she has failed to maintain a job, and I see no indication that she will ever be able to do that again in the reasonably near future. I don’t think there is any guarantee that once she is released from Richmond Hospital that she will even on her own volition continue with counseling. And I know for a fact, that you cannot force people outside of institutions *24 to engage in counseling, or even engage, so far as to come in for their medication — or even to take it once they have it.” Record at 290-291.
The trial court, too, found that based upon the evidence of L.C.’s actions in the past, it was reasonably probable to assume that she would continue down the same path. In conjunction with this there was a child to consider, and it was in the best interests of that child to become eligible for adoption rather than remaining in foster homes year after year waiting for her natural mother to accomplish some degree of stability.
As the majority pointed out, the findings of a trial court will be accepted if they are supported by evidence of probative value. There was sufficient evidence to support the findings of this trial court, and the judgment should be affirmed.