stating defendant, who affirmatively represented he had no objection at trial, was estopped under the doctrine of invited error from contending, on appeal, that evidence was inadmissible on chain of custody grounds
How later courts described this case
- stating defendant, who affirmatively represented he had no objection at trial, was estopped under the doctrine of invited error from contending, on appeal, that evidence was inadmissible on chain of custody grounds
- concluding that the defendant was estopped, pursuant to the invited error doctrine, from challenging admission of mere-fact impeachment evidence on appeal after agreeing to the admission of the evidence at trial
- holding that the plain-error rule permitted review of the one-act, one-crime issue because a violation and the potential for surplus conviction and sentence affected the integrity of the judicial process
- holding that the doctrine of invited error bars a defendant from requesting to proceed in one direction at trial only to later argue on appeal that the direction taken at trial constituted error
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW, specially concurring:
I am in agreement with the conclusion of the majority that the multiple convictions and concurrent sentences imposed by the circuit court upon defendant Bare-field violate the one-act, one-crime rule established by this court in People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551 (1977). Accordingly, it is appropriate for this court to remand Bare-field’s cause to the circuit court with directions that it vacate Barefield’s four convictions for unlawful possession of a motor vehicle.
I am also in agreement with the majority that in the cause of defendant Lyons, the circuit court did not err in granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude evidence that the victim had allegedly engaged in prior drug purchases.
I also agree with the result of the majority opinion that the use of the mere-fact method of impeachment by the circuit court in each of these three consolidated cases did not constitute plain error. However, I arrive at this conclusion on a basis different from that of the majority. I continue to adhere to my previously enunciated position that it should be within the wide discretion traditionally afforded the circuit court to permit the use of mere-fact impeachment if the court determines that it is the more appropriate impeachment method. For the reasons more fully stated in the dissenting opinion in People v. Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d 450, 464 (1999) (Rathje, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, J.), and my separate opinion in People v. Cox, 195 Ill. 2d 378, 392 (2001) (McMorrow, J., dissenting), it remains my belief that Atkinson, which held that, as a matter of law, it is always improper to use the mere-fact approach to impeach a testifying defendant, “unwarrantedly departed from our traditional jurisprudence by £remov[ing] from the trial court the discretion to determine whether or to what extent evidence is admissible.’ ” Cox, 195 Ill. 2d at 393 (McMorrow J., dissenting), quoting Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 472 (Rathje, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, J.).
JUSTICE RARICK joins in this special concurrence.