absolute immunity granted to forest preserve for injuries sustained by plaintiff while snowmobiling was justified in light of the “massive repairs” that might be required for landowners to make their property safe for snowmobiling in the absence of such immunity
How later courts described this case
- absolute immunity granted to forest preserve for injuries sustained by plaintiff while snowmobiling was justified in light of the “massive repairs” that might be required for landowners to make their property safe for snowmobiling in the absence of such immunity
- certain remedy clause not violated where plaintiff is restricted from suing a particular defendant but retains cause of action against third parties
- inherent danger of snowmobiling justified legislation limiting property owners’ liability to snowmobilers
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, with whom JUSTICE . GOLDENHERSH joins, dissenting:
Justice Goldenhersh and I believe that the complaint, in this case, even though amended, may still state a cause of action for wilful conduct. We also believe that the court errs in refusing to apply the 1984 amendment permitting recovery for a wilful failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. Citing no authority, the court holds the amendment inapplicable, saying that it became effective long after the injury occurred and this litigation began. Noting that its effective date was subsequent to the filing of the appellate court opinion, the majority concludes: “We decline to give retroactive application to the 1984 amendment.” (104 Ill. 2d at 135-36.) The rule, however, as we understand it, is clearly to the contrary. Our opinions consistently hold that, absent due process problems which are not present here, relevant legislation does apply at the appellate stage. In fact, we have just said in People v. Fernetti (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 19 , that “[i]t has long been recognized that a change in law will be given effect while a case is on direct review. [Citations.] This rule applies where a judicial decision has intervened, as well as where a statutory change has altered the law. [Citation.]” ( 104 Ill. 2d 19, 22 .) Our earlier opinions are to the same effect. “Where no vested rights are involved this court must decide the issues on the law as it stands at the time of our decision and not as of the time the cause of action accrued ***.” Hughes v. Illinois Public Aid Com. (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 374, 378 ; Rios v. Jones (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 488, 494-95 ; People ex rel. Bauer v. Elmhurst-Villa Park-Lombard Water Com. (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 139 , 144; Illinois Chiropractic Society v. Giello (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 306, 310 .
Since the amendment is, in our judgment, clearly applicable, we would consider the sufficiency of the complaint under the 1984 amendment, and, if it is found sufficient to state a cause of action under the amendatory act, remand the case for trial.