“reaffirm[ing] [the supreme court’s] long-standing rule that absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court[,] a sentence may not be altered upon review”
How later courts described this case
- “reaffirm[ing] [the supreme court’s] long-standing rule that absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court[,] a sentence may not be altered upon review”
- “the trial court is normally the proper forum in which a suitable sentence is to be determined and the trial judge’s decisions in regard to sentencing are entitled to great deference and weight.”
- the defendant’s sentence “must be based upon - 12 - No. 1-24-0185 the particular circumstances of each individual case”
- abuse-of-discretion standard applies to appellate review of sentences
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440 (2002)
We also reject defendant’s reliance on People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154 (1977), citing People v. Bolyard, 61 Ill. 2d 583, 589 (1975), where we stated that a proper sentence must be “based upon the particular circumstances of each individual case.
The opinion
MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting:
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds “that absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court a sentence may not be altered upon review.” Cited in support of this proposition are People v. Butler, 64 Ill. 2d 485 , People v. Burbank, 53 Ill. 2d 261 , and People v. Bonner, 37 Ill. 2d 553 . People v. Butler does not so hold. It merely states in passing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. People v. Bonner cites no authority, and People v. Burbank relied on People v. Taylor, 33 Ill. 2d 417 , and People v. Hampton, 44 Ill. 2d 41 , both decided long prior to the adoption of the 1970 Constitution. It should be noted, too, that Mr. Justice Schaefer, the author of People v. Butler, joined in the dissent in People v. Burbank, in which it was said:
“Finally, I disagree with the majority that a sentence is not to be modified on appeal unless the trial court, in imposing it, abused its discretion. Judicial discretion is abused ‘ “when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.” [Citation.] ’ Peek v. United States (9th cir.), 321 F.2d 934, 942 .) Neither the statutory provision which originaUy authorized reduction of sentences nor our Rule 615 (50 Ill. 2d R. 615) requires that there be an abuse of discretion shown as a prerequisite to the exercise of the power, and a reviewing court should review the propriety of the sentence in the same manner as other errors.”
The majority recognizes that the Constitution of 1970 provides that “All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 11), and that one of the purposes of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1001—1—2) is to implement the constitutional provision. It is impossible to reconcile these constitutional and statutory provisions with the requirement that a reviewing court limit its inquiry concerning the propriety of a sentence to the narrow question whether the trial court, in imposing it, abused its discretion.
To review sentences in the manner espoused by the majority vests the circuit courts with virtually unlimited discretion in imposing them. This broad discretion and the resultant disparity in sentences have been justly criticized. (See ABA Standards Relating to the Appellate Review of Sentences (Approved Draft 1968).) The implementation of the Constitution requires that sentences be reviewed not solely to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion but whether the circuit court followed the constitutional and statutory guidelines. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, pars. 1001-1-2; 1005-4-1; 1005-6-1.
MR. JUSTICE DOOLEY joins in this dissent.