first oral admission made 16 hours after arrest; written statement given 26 hours after arrest
How later courts described this case
- first oral admission made 16 hours after arrest; written statement given 26 hours after arrest
- where first oral admission occurred 16 hours after arrest and written statement was made 26 hours after arrest, totality of circumstances did not justify suppression of confession
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part, on other grounds by People v. R.D., 155 Ill. 2d 122 (1993)
See People v. Murphy (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 421; In re Lamb (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 383, overruled in part on other grounds, People v. R.D. (1993), 155 Ill. 2d 122, 134-39; People v. Hester (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 489; People v. Richardson (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 472; see also People v. House (1990), 141 Ill. 2d 323.
The opinion
MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting:
I dissent. I fail to perceive how the majority can acknowledge the extent of the mistreatment to which the respondent was subjected, and despite that fact, hold that the question of the illegal arrest was waived. In Muscarello v. Peterson, 20 Ill.2d 548 , an action seeking to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by a minor, the court, finding that there was “gross misconduct” on behalf of an insurance carrier, said “The court has a duty to see that the rights of an infant are adequately protected, and is bound to notice substantial irregularities even though objections are not properly presented on its behalf.” ( 20 Ill.2d 548, 555 .) The “gross misconduct” to which the Muscarello court referred was the alteration of a medical report. The irregularity which the majority here holds was waived was the illegal arrest of a 16-year-old defendant. In view of the fact that respondent’s statements are “the only evidence directly implicating him in the killing,” the rule of Muscarello should certainly apply in this case.
Concerning the illegal arrest and the treatment accorded this boy prior to his confession, the appellate court said: “This evidence establishes that the respondent was illegally detained, ***. The evidence also establishes that the respondent was held overnight seated in a chair and handcuffed to a wall, disclosing a police procedure which is to be severely condemned.” In re Lamb, 21 Ill. App. 3d 827, 835 .
The majority states “Although the police practice of leaving suspects handcuffed in a chair all night cannot be condoned, respondent was not interrogated or harassed by police officers during the night and was able to sleep off and on.” 61 Ill.2d at 388.
In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 , 87 S. Ct. 1428 , after holding that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was applicable in the case of juveniles, the Supreme Court said: “We appreciate that • special problems may arise with respect to waiver of the privilege [against self-incrimination] by or on behalf of children, and that there may well be some differences in technique —but not in principle — depending upon the age of the child and the presence and competence of parents. The participation of counsel will, of course, assist the police, Juvenile Courts and appellate tribunals in administering the privilege. If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.” 387 U.S. 1, 55 , 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 561 , 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1458 .
Despite the fact that “prior to his initial interrogation, respondent was repeatedly informed of his constitutional rights by all police officers who questioned him ***” (61 Ill.2d at 386), and his having been given food on two occasions, I find it difficult to rule out the possibility that the statement was the product of the “fright or despair” suggested by Gault.
The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial and the circuit court should be directed to consider the voluntariness of respondent’s statements in the light of Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 , 95 S. Ct. 2254 .
SCHAEFER and WARD, JJ., join in this dissent.