determining the exclusion of certain testimony was harmless because the defendant’s confession, corroborated only by the fact that the victim’s death was a homicide, was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, despite the defendant’s contention that her confession was coerced
How later courts described this case
- determining the exclusion of certain testimony was harmless because the defendant’s confession, corroborated only by the fact that the victim’s death was a homicide, was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, despite the defendant’s contention that her confession was coerced
- “[I]t is the defendant’s burden to overcome the presumption that a decision to not call a witness is within the realm of trial strategy.”
- “[b]ecause defendant’s custodial interrogation did not begin until Miranda warnings were given, a Seibert violation could not have occurred”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE TULLY, dissenting:
The majority hold that defendant’s motion to suppress her statements was properly denied. I disagree as to that portion of their holding and respectfully dissent.
People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322 (2008), is not only legally instructive, but also factually. The defendant in Lopez was brought to a police station at approximately 1 p.m. regarding a murder. He was questioned and advised that someone had implicated him. He provided the detectives with information and was left alone in the same room for four to five hours while the detectives continued their investigation. Although defendant was unhandcuffed, he was never told he was free to leave the police station. Furthermore, he was later questioned by the same detectives that had brought him in, questioned him, and left him in the interview room. After being questioned again, the defendant made an oral confession whereupon the detectives stopped questioning him, gave him his Miranda warnings, and then terminated the interview. Two hours later, the defendant gave a handwritten statement memorializing his confession. This objective evidence, despite subjective evidence consisting of a detective’s testimony denying that he used the “question first, warn later” technique or that defendant was a suspect, was sufficient to warrant suppression of defendant’s subsequent handwritten confession. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d. at 363.
In the case at bar, defendant was brought to a police station at around 8 or 9 p.m. regarding her son’s death. She was questioned for about 30 minutes concerning the events of the incident. After providing the detectives with information, she was left alone in the room for about four hours as the detectives continued their investigation. Defendant was also unhandcuffed but never told she was free to leave the police station. Defendant, around 1 a.m., was questioned and confronted by the same detectives that had questioned her earlier and left her in the room. It was at this point that the defendant made an oral confession and was read her Miranda rights. Questioning was terminated and defendant was transferred to another room. After recanting shortly thereafter, defendant was subjected to an inconclusive polygraph test and multiple interrogations over the next 24 hours. She confessed a second time, was then told her confession was inaccurate, and then modified her confession once again, finally memorializing it through videotape.
The objective evidence between Lopez and the instant case is similar and therefore helpful in evaluating the case at bar. Furthermore, despite the State’s argument, it is difficult to see how defendant’s statement could have been “spontaneous” after four hours and two separate interview sessions. Moreover, the exchange in which defendant ultimately made her statement was one in which the detectives admitted to “confronting” defendant about inconsistencies in her information and accused her of lying. Moreover, the facts suggest that the detectives continually informed defendant of various inconsistencies and details overlooked by defendant several times. Despite defendant confessing to the same result, the detectives felt compelled to continually encourage her to modify her statement until they were satisfied it conformed to the evidence. In any event, after considering the factors outlined in Lopez, this court should find that the evidence when viewed in its totality supports an inference that the detectives engaged in some form of “question first, warn later” interrogation.
The next question now is whether, after receiving midstream Miranda warnings, “a reasonable person, in defendant’s situation, would have understood that he retained a choice about continuing to talk to police.” Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 364 . The relevant facts to consider are:
“[T]he passage of time between the unwarned and warned statements, the location where those statements were taken, whether the same person questioned the suspect during the unwarned and warned statements, whether details obtained during the unwarned phase were used during the warned phase, and whether the suspect was advised that the unwarned statement could not be used against the suspect.” Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 364-65 .
Approximately 20 hours passed between defendant’s unwarned and warned statements which I acknowledge is not an exceptionally long or short period of time. Next, both statements were taken at the police station in interview rooms. The interrogations preceding both statements, as well as all other interviews, were conducted by the same detective, often with other detectives present. Details obtained during the unwarned phase were clearly used during the warned phase, and nothing in the record indicates that defendant was advised that her unwarned statement could not be used against her.
In Lopez, the defendant was a juvenile who was questioned by an assistant State’s Attorney and not a detective, had received Miranda warnings twice, and had his father present during his inculpatory statement as well. Despite this, his statement was ruled inadmissible because the same detective was present at both statements, they were taken near each other in time, and the defendant was never advised his oral statement was inadmissible. Here, despite a longer period of time in between the statements, defendant was treated similarly and experienced added stress where the same detective, with other detectives present, continuously questioned her. Under these circumstances, I cannot conclude that a reasonable person, in defendant’s situation, would have understood that she retained a choice about continuing to talk to police, especially where she was never warned that her prior statement could not be used against her.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.