holding that if defendants developed the intent to deprive the victim of his money only after they beat him unconscious, theft would constitute larceny from the person, but not robbery
How later courts described this case
- holding that if defendants developed the intent to deprive the victim of his money only after they beat him unconscious, theft would constitute larceny from the person, but not robbery
- noting this Court's treatment of M.C.L. § 768.32, which permits an instruction on lesser offenses when supported by the evidence
- stating that the jury is free to accept some parts of a defendant’s account and reject others
- “We are committed to the view that the crime of larceny from the person embraces the taking of property in the possession and immediate presence of the victim.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part, on other grounds by People v. Cornell, 466 Mich. 335 (2002)
236 N.W.2d 473, 481 (Mich. 1975), overruled on other grounds by People v. Cornell, 646 N.W.2d 127
Overruled in part, on other grounds by People v. Stephens, 416 Mich. 252 (1983)
395 Mich 408, 415; 236 NW2d 473 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds by People v Stephens, 416 Mich 252, 260-261; 330 NW2d 675 (1982).
Overruled in part, on other grounds by Hesse v. Ashland Oil, Inc, 466 Mich. 21 (2002)
236 NW2d 473 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds People v Cornell, 466 Mich 35, 357
The opinion
M. S. Coleman, J.
(concurring). I concur in reversing the Court of Appeals and reinstating defendant’s conviction.
The question of whether unarmed robbery and larceny from a person are degrees of armed robbery within the meaning of MCLA 768.32; MSA 28.1055 has been troublesome, but I agree that they are "necessarily included offenses”.
MCLA 750.529; MSA 28.797 says in part:
"Any person who shall assault another, and shall feloniously rob, steal and take from his person, or in his presence, any money or other property, which may be the subject of larceny, such robber being armed with a dangerous weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years.”
It is the taking of "any money or other property, which may be the subject of larceny” which distinguishes this offense from the varieties of assault. Unarmed robbery [MCLA 750.530; MSA 28.798] uses the same language of taking but provides for an assault by one "not being armed with a dangerous weapon” (absent the element of dangerous weapon, as the majority states). MCLA 750.357; MSA 28.589 provides the penalty for those committing "the offense of larceny by stealing from the person of another” ("robbery” absent the element of force).
The trial judge gave proper instructions.
The judge is responsible for submitting the case to the jury. Although advice of counsel may be requested, the judge alone has the authority to decide what is to be submitted. Indeed, the judge may give an "all or nothing” instruction upon *431 request of defense counsel (see People v Henry, 395 Mich 367 ; 236 NW2d 489 [1975]), but I cannot agree with Justice Lindemer that the judge must give such an instruction if so requested.
In People v Ora Jones, 395 Mich 379 ; 236 NW2d 461 (1975), I said the trial judge need not grant defendant’s request for an instruction on offenses only vaguely related to the initial charge or without evidentiary support. Similarly, the judge is not restricted in his charge by counsel’s demand that the jury consider only the offense charged.
Reluctantly, I agree with Justice Lindemer’s analysis of the majority’s opinion as to cutting off included offenses instructions according to penalty. I agree with him because I believe him to be right. The reluctance is born of the foreseeably lengthened "laundry list” of offenses and jurors who would be required to absorb possibly dozens of pages of instructions regarding the many offenses possible under the "cognate”, "related” or "allied” offense theory of Ora Jones .