holding the "household or family exclusion clause" in a policy of liability insurance violated public policy as expressed in our financial responsibility laws and was thus void
How later courts described this case
- holding the "household or family exclusion clause" in a policy of liability insurance violated public policy as expressed in our financial responsibility laws and was thus void
- applying financial responsibility law provisions to policy purchased prior- to accident and striking down family exclusion clause
- declaring household exclusion void and imposing liability to the policy limits
- "The basic purpose for the Legislature's enactment of financial responsibility laws was to protect innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents from financial disaster."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PEDERSON, Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent. Justice Hopkins of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in his analysis of “Public Policy and the Formulation of a Rule of Law,” published in 37 Brooklyn L.Rev. 323 (1971), stressed that public policy, like all terms of undefinable breadth, may be used as a cover for uncertain reasoning and that if public policy is to be used as a ground for judicial decision, it must be justified by recourse to an analysis of the reasons which are the foundation for the policy.
I am not convinced that legislative intent, in providing for proof of financial responsibility, can be logically carried over to the general law covering liability insurance contracts. When the courts engage in lawmaking activities, they should confine themselves to the interstices. The rationality should not be based upon a determination of what is good or bad in the light of society’s goals unless the Legislature has disclosed its intent.
In over twenty-one years of working with the financial responsibility provisions of the motor vehicle laws, I failed to encounter any real evidence that the Legislature intended, or even considered, that every motor vehicle liability contract must provide the coverage necessary to qualify it as proof of financial responsibility. On the contrary, it is common knowledge that the premiums charged for certified proof of financial responsibility coverage far exceed those which the public would be willing, or is accustomed, to pay for liability coverage.
The majority opinion apparently finds ambiguity in the contract language, and that because an insurance contract is a contract of adhesion it must be construed most strongly against the insurance company. Although I agree entirely with the legal principle stated, I find no ambiguity in the contract.
Finally, the majority state that there is no certification requirement contained in Chapter 39-16, NDCC. I interpret § 39-16-05, NDCC, as requiring certification, although I agree that it is not the same type of certification required by Chapter 39-16.-1, NDCC.
The judgment should have been affirmed.