reviewing Gaddis and the “limited scope” of the incredible dubiosity rule developed from it
How later courts described this case
- reviewing Gaddis and the “limited scope” of the incredible dubiosity rule developed from it
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Hunter, J.
The Attorney General, in his petition for rehearing, complains that this Court has altered its standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence by the opinion heretofore filed.
The question with which this Court concerned itself was whether any reasonable man could have concluded from the evidence that there was sufficient substantial evidence of probative value to support a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to answer that question in a case where all the evidence is circumstantial, we were required to ask ourselves whether any reasonable man could have concluded from the evidence that every reasonable hypothesis of innocence was excluded.
Each paragraph of the Court’s opinion must be read in context with every other paragraph. When that is done, it will be seen that the standard of this Court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction has not changed. On appeal, in order to affirm such a conviction as based upon sufficient evidence, this Court must find that there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a jury could reasonably find or infer the existence of each material element beyond a reasonable doubt. If reasonable men might differ as to whether the evidence most favorable to the State is sufficient, the verdict of the jury will stand. Only where no reasonable man could be convinced of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt will the verdict and judgment be reversed for insufficient evidence. Baker v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 55 , 138 N. E. 2d 641 ; Easton v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 338 , 228 N. E. 2d 6 .
The standard set forth in the above paragraph also appears in the original opinion in this case. Therefore, it is clear that *86 the original opinion made no change in the law of Indiana relative to appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence. The voids in the evidence in this case compelled the result which we reached.
Rehearing denied.
Lewis, C. J., Arterburn, Jackson and Mote, JJ. concur.
Note. — Reported in 232 N. E. 2d 874 . Rehearing Opinion Reported in 235 N. E. 2d 62 .