writing that the sets forth pleading requirements that are “designed to reduce the number of frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits at an early stage before litigation expenses mount”
How later courts described this case
- writing that the sets forth pleading requirements that are “designed to reduce the number of frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits at an early stage before litigation expenses mount”
- upholding a circuit court's ruling that a doctor was not competent to provide nursing standard of care testimony because nursing is unique school of medicine that requires a separate license
- upholding the trial court's ruling that a doctor was not competent to testify as to the standard of care for the nursing profession and granting a directed verdict for the hospital
- holding a medical doctor was “not competent to testify regarding the standard of care for the nursing profession and nurse Lewis’ deviations therefrom.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by Forsberg v. Edward Hospital & Health Services, 389 Ill. App. 3d 434 (2009)
Although we agree with defendant that the section 2 — 622 report was not properly before the trial court, we disagree with his assertion that this result is required by Sullivan v. Edward Hospital, 209 Ill. 2d 100, 117 (2004), DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, 147 Ill. 2d 57 (1992), or McAlister v. Schick, 147 Ill. 2d 84 (1992).
The opinion
JUSTICE RARICK, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority’s holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that plaintiff violated Supreme Court Rule 213(g) (177 Ill. 2d R. 213(g)), and in striking this portion of Dr. Barnhart’s testimony. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that Dr. Barnhart was not competent to testify to the standard of care applicable to the nursing profession in this case.
The majority holds that this case “falls squarely within the license requirement of Dolan [v. Galluzzo, 77 Ill. 2d 279 (1979)]” (209 Ill. 2d at 119), and rejects plaintiffs reliance on Wingo v. Rockford Memorial Hospital, 292 Ill. App. 3d 896 (1997), which set forth an exception whereby physicians may testify regarding “what a nurse is required to communicate to a physician.” Wingo, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 906 . While the majority finds that “the precise factual scenario of Wingo” (209 Ill. 2d at 118) is not present in the instant case, I believe that any factual distinctions are insignificant where the rationale behind the Wingo decision fully applies.
While declining to address the merits of Wingo, the majority notes Wingo’s holding that the reason for the license requirement of Dolan is to “ ‘prevent a higher standard of care being imposed upon the defendant and to ensure the testifying expert has expertise in dealing with the patient’s medical problem and treatment and that the allegations of negligence are within the expert’s knowledge and observation.’ ” 209 Ill. 2d at 118, quoting Wingo, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 906 . The majority also acknowledges that Dr. Barnhart has “substantial experience in observing and working with physicians and nurses in the area of patient fall protection.” (Emphasis added.) 209 Ill. 2d at 105. Therefore here, as in Wingo, the concerns expressed in Dolan are not at issue because the record establishes that Dr. Barnhart’s particular expertise encompasses the proper standard of care for both physicians and nurses pertaining to patient fall protection. Thus, I would adopt the reasoning of Wingo which holds that the license requirements of Dolan do not apply where the allegations of negligence “do not concern an area of medicine about which there would be a different standard between physician and another school of medicine.” Wingo, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 906 .
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the circuit court erred in granting a directed verdict for the hospital because Dr. Barnhart was competent to testify as to nurse Lewis’ deviations from the proper procedures in the area of patient fall protection. The judgments of the appellate and circuit courts should be reversed in part. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.