finding that defendants’ voluntary intoxication was not so extreme as to prevent them from forming requisite intent to commit burglary was sufficiently supported by evidence that one or both defendants had worn gloves to avoid leaving fingerprints
How later courts described this case
- finding that defendants’ voluntary intoxication was not so extreme as to prevent them from forming requisite intent to commit burglary was sufficiently supported by evidence that one or both defendants had worn gloves to avoid leaving fingerprints
- procedure for securing postconviction DNA -17- testing requires defendant to establish a chain of custody for physical items to be tested
- procedure for securing postconviction DNA testing requires defendant to establish a chain of custody for physical items to be tested
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The defendants are not entitled to 592 days’ credit for time served prior to sentencing. They are, as the State argues, entitled to 231 days’ sentence credit for time spent in custody between their arrest on the present charges and their January 27, 1986, sentencing for the residential burglary which they committed in Godfrey. The majority distinguishes Krankel on the basis that the defendant was sentenced to a prison term which was to be served consecutively to the sentences for prior offenses. The reasoning, however, in Krankel should be followed and this court should not follow the decisions of Higgerson and Powell. Until the defendant in Krankel was sentenced, he was in custody on the prior sentence. If we rationalize that the defendants are entitled to sentencing credit during the time from the sentence for the Godfrey burglary until the sentence in this case, the same reasoning should have applied in Krankel. Krankel was just as much in custody not on bond, serving a sentence, and at the same time, not sentenced on the second charge. The question of whether the sentence in Krankel was consecutive is not cause for distinguishing this case.
As stated, section 5 — 8—7(b) provides that the offender shall be given credit “for time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed.” The legislature has specifically provided for granting credit for time served on sentences from another State or district court of the United States. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 1005 — 8—1(e), (f).) There is no similar legislative provision which applies to the facts here.
On January 27, 1986, when the Bradneys were sentenced for the Godfrey burglary and until sentenced here, they were in custody on an unrelated offense. They should not be entitled to credit for time served from the date of sentencing of the Godfrey burglary until the sentencing in this case.
As above suggested, this is not a concurrent-consecutive problem. The sentences are concurrent from the time both sentences are imposed, January 23, 1987. The opinion correctly states the sentence runs concurrently with any prior unexpired State sentence.
In all other respects, I concur with the majority.