“ ‘It is well established that when hearsay evidence is admitted without an objection, it is to be considered and given its natural probative effect.’ ”
How later courts described this case
- “ ‘It is well established that when hearsay evidence is admitted without an objection, it is to be considered and given its natural probative effect.’ ”
- collecting authorities; observing that “the overwhelming weight of authority supports” rule
- “when hearsay evidence is admitted without an objection, it is to be considered and given its natural probative effect”; such evidence “may be considered by the administrative body and by the courts on review”
- setting forth the old standard
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Siler v. Department of Employment Security
(See Jackson v. Board of Review of the Department of Labor (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 501, 475 N.E.2d 879, superseded by statute as stated in Siler v. Department of Employment Security (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 971, 549 N.E.2d 760; Kelley v. Department of Labor (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 958, 513 N.E.2d 988.
The opinion
JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting:
I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the appellate court. The majority has taken from a Wisconsin case (Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck (1941), 237 Wis. 249 , 296 N.W. 636 ) a definition of the statutory term “misconduct” (105 Ill. 2d at 507), and although I find it amorphous to the point of being meaningless, I accept it for the purposes of this case. I am of the opinion that the record does not support the finding that plaintiff was guilty of misconduct.
It is true that plaintiff, on at least two prior occasions, had been cautioned by a superior about drinking on the job and that she had a drinking problem. There is no evidence, however, that she had been drinking beer or any other alcoholic liquor on the night of the occurrence upon which the discharge is allegedly based. She admitted having possession of the beer can but denied having any vodka. Her explanation of why she had the beer can is entirely plausible, and nothing in the record contradicts it.
The testimony concerning prior admonitions is vague and confusing. One witness thought plaintiff had been given a written warning but later decided he was in error. The individuals who were present on the night of the occurrence were not called as witnesses, and plaintiff’s unequivocal statement that she had not been drinking on that occasion stands undenied and undisputed in the record.
I do not quarrel with the right of the employer to enforce a rule against drinking on the job. I am of the opinion, however, that the deprivation of unemployment compensation to an employee discharged after 16 years of service should be supported by proof that violation of the rule was the actual cause of the discharge. Informality in the proceedings before the claims adjudicator and the referee is, I am sure, commendable, but should not be pursued to the point of completely omitting evidence which sustains the finding upon which the decision is based.
CLARK, C.J., and SIMON, J., join in this dissent.