holding that there was no error in the imposition of consecutive sentences where “trial court segregated the crimes committed against each rape victim and considered the fact that this defendant had committed two separate crimes against two different victims”
How later courts described this case
- holding that there was no error in the imposition of consecutive sentences where “trial court segregated the crimes committed against each rape victim and considered the fact that this defendant had committed two separate crimes against two different victims”
- holding that witness had an independent basis to support in-court identification where the description made prior to any pre-trial identification was "substantially an accurate description of the defendant”
- observing that commencement of a prosecution is governed by Ind.Code § 35-34-1-1, which provides that the filing of an information or indictment begins the formal criminal process
- identification not suggestive where victim had not heard the defendant’s name before selecting his photograph as the man who raped her
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I vote to affirm these convictions, but to remand to the sentencing judge for a clear and meaningful statement justifying the imposition of consecutive sentences. The law invests the sentencing judge with the authority to impose consecutive sentences, however in exercising this authority the court must give specific reasons for its actions. Brown v. State (1982), Ind., 442 N.E.2d 1109 . The only basis offered by the judge on the record to support his determination of consecutive sentences is that there were "two separate crimes". In my view such statement is not sufficient to satisfy this requirement of specificity.
PRENTICE, J., concurs.