People v. Urdiales

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority’s analysis of virtually all the issues presented in this case, including its examination of the questions impacting on the guilt phase of defendant’s trial. I part company only with the majority’s view that during the sentencing phase the jury need not be specifically instructed on the mitigating effect of a defendant’s history of abuse, as expressly required by subsection (c)(6) of section 9 — 1 (720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(c)(6) (West 2004)). 225 Ill. 2d at 449.

Subsection (c)(6) is one of a parcel of statutory protections enacted following the spate of seriously flawed capital cases that prompted the current moratorium on executions in this state. This subsection states:

“The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to consider any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. *** Mitigating factors may include but need not be limited to the following:

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(6) the defendant’s background includes a history of extreme emotional or physical abuse[.Y’ (Emphases added.) 720 ILCS 5/9—1(c)(6) (West 2004).

After noting that this subsection was in effect at the time of defendant’s trial, the majority concludes that he has forfeited this claim. 225 Ill. 2d at 450. Ordinarily, I would agree that it is unnecessary to conduct a new sentencing hearing solely due to the omission of a specific mitigating factor as long as a catchall instruction is included informing the jury that the failure to list a particular mitigating factor “ ‘does not preclude [the jury’s] consideration of the evidence’ ” (225 Ill. 2d at 449). See Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d at 556-57. In this instance, however, I am otherwise persuaded by the historical underpinnings of the statutory changes at issue. The legislature enacted those changes to reform our seriously flawed capital punishment system. The legislature’s efforts, combined with those of this court (see 188 Ill. 2d Rs. 43, 411, 412(c), 416, 417, 701(b), 714), have effectuated fundamental changes in capital proceedings with the laudable goal of reducing the number of erroneous capital convictions and sentences entered in this state.

With that goal in mind, the legislature added subsection (c)(6), requiring a jury instruction specifically pointing out the need for jurors to consider a defendant’s background as a victim of abuse. 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(c)(6) (West 2004). The statutory language mandates that the court “shall" instruct the jury on the listed mitigating factors, including a history of abuse noted in subsection (c)(6). The plain language added to redress Illinois’ troubled capital punishment system demonstrates the legislature’s clear intent to differentiate this factor from the myriad of possible mitigation sources encompassed by the catchall instruction relied on by the majority. 225 Ill. 2d at 450. Thus, where, as here, there was evidence that defendant had undergone emotional and physical abuse as a child, the statute obliged the trial court to instruct the jury on this mitigating factor. Reliance on a catchall instruction does not adhere to the will of the legislature or uphold the spirit of the amendments.

Furthermore, the legislature added another statutory protection to overcome the fundamental defects in our prior capital punishment system. That provision grants this court the authority to vacate a particular death sentence and impose a term of years if that sentence is “fundamentally unjust” (720 ILCS 5/9 — 1 (i) (West 2004)). Here, it is fundamentally unjust to ignore the legislature’s clear mandate that juries must be specifically apprised of the relevance of mitigating abuse evidence. Our legislature’s capital punishment reforms merit the highest degree of judicial adherence because they are designed to rectify the serious problems in our prior system.

In addition, all the mental-health witnesses in this case agreed that defendant suffered from some type of mental disorder, including possible organic brain disease, although they could not agree on a single diagnosis. 225 Ill. 2d at 374-81. To submit to a jury the question of whether to impose the death penalty on defendant without strict adherence to the safeguards imposed by both this court and our legislature flies in the face of fundamental justice and undermines these fundamental reform efforts. The absence of the mitigating-factor instruction in subsection (c)(6) unjustly contravenes the clear intent of our legislature and leaves the jury to resolve the life-and-death issue of imposing the death penalty without the specific guidance of a mitigating factor the legislature has deemed sufficiently critical to single out for express consideration. Here, the evidence of abuse was relegated to the broad, undefined category of nonspecific potential mitigation material, failing to give it the distinct recognition intended by the legislature.

Given the immense gravity of the issues in capital proceedings, I believe both fundamental justice and the reliability of this state’s capital punishment system require our courts to apply all legislative and judicial reform measures unwaveringly. If we do not, we risk a recurrence of the tragic circumstances that prompted those reforms. Thus, although I abhor the heinous crimes committed by this defendant, I cannot countenance any erosion of our revised system of capital punishment caused by lax enforcement of the newly minted safeguards. Because the jury was not properly instructed in this case, I would remand this cause for a new sentencing hearing incorporating an instruction specifically noting the mitigating effect of emotional or physical abuse inflicted on defendant. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.