holding that the trial court had discretion to prohibit defendant from residing within one mile of the victim given the statutory authority to prohibit direct or indirect contact with an individual
How later courts described this case
- holding that the trial court had discretion to prohibit defendant from residing within one mile of the victim given the statutory authority to prohibit direct or indirect contact with an individual
- finding that the defendant was in a position of trust with the victim, who was spending the night with the defendant’s daughter at the time of the molestation
- finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court considered the defendant’s position of trust with the victim to be an aggravating circumstance
- ‘The trial court is not obliged to weigh or credit mitigating factors the way a defendant suggests.... [or] to afford any weight to [the defendant’s] childhood history as a mitigating factor in that [the defendant] never established why his past victimization led to his current behavior.’
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DARDEN, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent.
I am deeply troubled by the fact that the trial court had ordered Hines to undergo a psychosexual evaluation and then expressly used the information gained from it when imposing sentence. Further, I find that the nature of Hines' criminal history combined with its significant distance in *1286 time from the offense here render that consideration to be marginal for sentencing purposes. Therefore, because we are unable to determine the weight given by the trial court to the evaluation information, I would remand for resentencing wherein the trial court did not consider Hines' admission during the course of the court-ordered evaluation to uncharged misconduct.