rejecting claim that new trial was warranted because counsel was ineffective in failing to prove-up impeachment of Gray with the State’s discovery response admitting to a deal, finding that presentation of the discovery response would not have resulted in a different verdict in that case, where substantial evidence other than Gray’s testimony linked Williams to the crimes
How later courts described this case
- rejecting claim that new trial was warranted because counsel was ineffective in failing to prove-up impeachment of Gray with the State’s discovery response admitting to a deal, finding that presentation of the discovery response would not have resulted in a different verdict in that case, where substantial evidence other than Gray’s testimony linked Williams to the crimes
- rejecting claim of ineffective assistance predicated on counsel’s failure to call a witness when, even accepting that counsel knew the witness existed, “[w]e cannot fault defense counsel for failing to pursue a witness who was apparently unavailable”
- rejecting defendant’s argument that witness “must have considered” that “her best strategy was to cooperate with the authorities in fabricating a version of events” at the time she made the prior consistent statement
- finding no questioning of defense counsel was required where the trial court conducted a proper examination of the factual bases for defendant’s claims and found them meritless.
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE CLARK, concurring:
I concur with the opinion of the court, but write separately to explain the differences between the instant case and People v. Jimerson (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 12 .
Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for his role in the same gang rape and double homicide for which Verneal Jimerson was convicted and sentenced to death in a separate trial. I dissented in Jimerson, stating I would have reversed the defendant’s conviction because his counsel (1) failed to produce evidence that Paula Gray gave testimony, under oath, which exonerated Jimerson on four prior occasions; (2) failed to produce evidence that Gray was mentally retarded; and (3) did not offer Gray’s prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. (Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d at 57 (Clark, J., dissenting).) The evidence in Jimerson was closely balanced in light of the defects in Gray’s testimony and the alibi evidence presented by Jimerson.
Although the two cases relate to the same crimes, I believe the instant case is distinguishable from Jimerson. The only evidence which linked Jimerson to the crimes was the testimony of Paula Gray. While Gray was the only occurrence witness to testify in this case, she was not the only witness to implicate Williams. Charles McCraney testified that on the night of the murders, he saw Williams enter the apartment building in which Carol Scmal’s body was found. In addition, McCraney testified that on the day following the murders, he heard Williams make incriminating statements.' McCraney also testified in Jimerson, but he was unable to place Jimerson at the scene of the crime. Further, unlike Jimerson, Williams did not offer any alibi evidence at his trial.
Based on these distinctions, the case against Williams is stronger than that against Jimerson, and therefore I concur with the majority opinion affirming defendant’s conviction and sentence.