reversing trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs MCRA claim because evidence supported an inference that plaintiff was speaking out about the broader public issue of anti-smoking policies, and not merely her “personal interests or internal office grievances”
How later courts described this case
- reversing trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs MCRA claim because evidence supported an inference that plaintiff was speaking out about the broader public issue of anti-smoking policies, and not merely her “personal interests or internal office grievances”
- to defeat defense of qualified immunity under the Civil Rights Act, plaintiff was “obliged to show that the defendants deprived her of a ‘clearly established’ right, that is, one, not in the abstract but based on particular circumstances, of which a reasonable person would have been aware at the time”
- "To overcome a claim of immunity, it is not necessary for the courts to have previously considered a particular situation identical to the one faced by the government official. It is enough, rather, that there existed case law sufficient to clearly establish that, if a court were presented with such a situation, the court would find that the plaintiff's rights were violated"
- “There certainly has been considerable public debate about the dangers of smoking both to smokers and others in their immediate vicinity and the extent to which smoking should be tolerated in public places”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Brown, J.
(concurring). Although I fully agree with the careful and sound treatment of this matter by the majority, I believe that the same result could be reached more directly. I am of opinion that the plaintiffs affidavit, cited by the majority in note 6 at 276, is sufficient to raise an issue of material fact as to whether the alleged actions of the defendants and certain of their colleagues (e.g., another supervisor) were threatening and were intended to intimidate or coerce the plaintiff to refrain from exercising her rights to free speech under the Federal and State Constitutions. See Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 821, 822-823 (1985). This most certainly is a jury question at this stage of the proceedings.
The plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity to establish that the remarks attributed to the defendants were substantially accurate, and that their clear implications accurately reflected their state of mind. The granting of summary judgment in such cases “is disfavored.” Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17 (1989). Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809 (1991).
The abuse of power by public officials over their subordinates — whether by intimidation and coercion either to engage in improper conduct or, as alleged here, to refrain from exercising rights — must be extirpated. It is in this area that the courts, which are often the final forum to which victims of such abuse can turn, must act with particular care to find the truth. No conduct strikes me as being more coercive than for a government official, one vested with the public trust, to exercise his powers in the abusive manner here alleged. This *278 would seem to be particularly egregious in this context where it was intended to chill the free speech rights of a subordinate.