stating that Minnesota Supreme Court has expressly rejected the argument that a driver has a right under Sixth Amendment to consult with attorney before chemical testing
How later courts described this case
- stating that Minnesota Supreme Court has expressly rejected the argument that a driver has a right under Sixth Amendment to consult with attorney before chemical testing
- stating that a driver's right to counsel is not vindicated unless the driver is "given a reasonable time to contact and talk with counsel" (quotation omitted)
- stating that the constitutional right to counsel does not attach in a criminal case until the prosecution reaches a “critical stage”
- holding that criminal defendants have a limited right to confer with counsel before deciding whether to submit to alcohol screening
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
YETKA, Justice.
We stated in McDonnell v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848, 853 (Minn.1991):
[Gjiven the reasonable reliance of law enforcement officials on prior decisions of this court in creating and administering the present Implied Consent Advisory, and given the enormous burden on the administration of justice that would result from giving Friedman completely retroactive effect, we limit the application of Friedman to the three appeals now before this court, to any case in which the Implied Consent Advisory has been challenged as a violation of the right to counsel guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution now pending before a district court, before the court of appeals, or before this court, and to any case arising after the date of Friedman’s, release.
We confronted a similar issue after we filed our decision in Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Public Safety, 310 Minn. 405 , 247 *838 N.W.2d 385 (1976). On petition for rehearing, we said:
Because police officers have reasonably relied on our earlier decision in State v. Palmer, 291 Minn. 302 , 191 N.W.2d 188 (1971), it was our intent that the informational requirement be applied only to cases arising after the date of the decision. The holding on the facts of the case was more narrow — appellant requested an opportunity to consult with an attorney and his request was denied. These circumstances define the impact of our holding to cases pending on the date of the decision in this court, district court, and county or municipal court. In all other cases predating the decision, no right to counsel will be recognized * * *.
Id. at 428 , 247 N.W.2d at 398 . In State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn.1988), we stated that those who had not previously raised the constitutional issue had waived the objection. Friedman thus applies retroactively only to cases pending on the date of the Friedman decision where the driver properly and in a timely fashion requested an opportunity to consult with an attorney, the request was denied, and the driver properly challenged the denial in district court as a violation of the right to counsel under the Minnesota Constitution. Amendments to pleadings that purport to raise the right-to-counsel issue will not relate back to the original filing date as relation back would be inconsistent with McDonnell’s limitation on Friedman’s retroactive application. Only if the issue of right to counsel under the Minnesota Constitution had actually been raised in district court prior to June 7, 1991, will Friedman apply retroactively.