holding, on direct review of first-degree murder conviction, that "[t]he jury may infer the requisite mental state from the defendant's knowledge of the circumstances and subsequent participation in the offense"
How later courts described this case
- holding, on direct review of first-degree murder conviction, that "[t]he jury may infer the requisite mental state from the defendant's knowledge of the circumstances and subsequent participation in the offense"
- noting that some State courts require inquiry into prosecutor’s explanation for challenge “whenever a Soares-type objection is made to the use of a peremptory challenge”
- holding that Commonwealth’s exclusion of 92% of African-American' venirepersons as compared with 34% of .white venirepersons excluded established prima facie case
- art. 1 "delineat[es] those generic group affiliations which may not permissibly form the basis for juror exclusion"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated in part, on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 383 (2018)
387 N.E.2d 499, 511 (Mass. 1979), abrogated in part on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Robertson, 105 N.E.3d 253
Declined to follow by People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87 (1981)
In this regard, we part company with the courts in People v Wheeler (22 Cal 3d 258, supra), Commonwealth v Soares ( — Mass —, 387 NE2d 499, supra)21 and State v Crespin (94 NM 486, supra) to the ex
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 110 (1983)
The instant case was on direct appeal (notices of appeal having been filed June 19, 20, and 26, 1978) when Soares was decided and is distinguishable from Reddick v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 398, 399-404 (1980), in which the court held that the Soares principle should not, in all but a narrow category of cases (not here relevant), be applied retroactively in cases where direct appeal rights have been exhausted — or hav…
Distinguished by W. R. Grace & Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 378 Mass. 577 (1979)
377 Mass. 461 (1979), that principle is inapplicable here.
The opinion
Braucher, J.
(concurring in the result, with whom
Quirico and Wilkins, JJ., join). At the trial in 1977, the defendants properly raised the point that the prosecutor was using his peremptory challenges to cause the Commonwealth to discriminate against prospective black jurors on the basis of race. Given an opportunity to respond, the prosecutor declined, and the judge overruled the objections without further inquiry. The result was that twelve of the thirteen prospective black jurors, otherwise qualified, were excused. On the basis of the record of extraordinary circumstances in this particular case, and notwithstanding our decision in Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 367 Mass. 419, 420 (1975), I concur in the court’s conclusion that the pattern of the prosecutor’s conduct must fee held to have exceeded the broad, but not limitless, range of discretion permitted in the exercise of peremptory challenges and to have violated the basic requirements of fairness. The defendants are therefore entitled to the relief ordered in the concluding paragraph of the court’s opinion. Early in 1976 the then Chief Justice of the Superior Court declared a mistrial in similar cir *494 cumstances in the same county. See Commonwealth v. Flowers, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 557, 569 (1977) (Brown, J., concurring).
I see no occasion, however, for the decision of any constitutional question, State or Federal, for critical review of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, or for ápproval or disapproval of the decision of a sharply divided court in People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978). In particular, I refrain from attributing speculative types of "group bias” to members of "discrete groups.” Moreover, this case presents no issue as to misuse of peremptory challenges by a criminal defendant, as to discrimination by reason of sex, or as to the quashing of a venire, and the court’s discussion of such issues is not necessary to its decision. If we must ultimately consider such issues on a constitutional basis, it may be wise to defer to any guidance which may come from the United States Supreme Court on the basis of the United States Constitution. Holdings involvipg interpretation of the Massachusetts Constitution seem gratuitous and premature.