holding that where a man was seriously injured while working, and his wife and children rushed to the hospital and found him there with permanent and serious injuries, the wife and children’s shock followed closely on the heels of the negligent act
How later courts described this case
- holding that where a man was seriously injured while working, and his wife and children rushed to the hospital and found him there with permanent and serious injuries, the wife and children’s shock followed closely on the heels of the negligent act
- stating that child has an interest in a parent’s society and affection at least while living in the household
- recognizing child’s claim for loss of parental society and for mental anguish deriving from employer’s negligence and observations of their father’s pain
- permitted recovery by a mother and children for emotional distress from witnessing husband-father in a hospital after he had sustained quadriplegic injuries in a work-related accident; the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated that "[a] plaintiff who rushes onto the accident scene and finds a loved one injured has no greater entitlement to compensation for that shock than a plaintiff who rushes instead to the hospital. So long as the shock follows closely on the heels of the accident, the two types of injury are equally foreseeable." (Id. 413 N.E.2d at 697)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Lijoi v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980) (establishing dependent child’s loss of consortium action for injury to parent), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lijoi v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 28 Mass.App.Ct. 926, 548 N.E.2d 893 (1990);
Declined to follow by Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31 (1996)
We decline to follow Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 518-19, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980), wherein the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court expanded the Dziokonski rule to include emotional distress claims predicated on viewing the injured person at the hospital rather than at the scene of the accident,.
The opinion
Hennessey, C.J.
(dissenting). I agree with the opinion of the court in its conclusion and reasoning that a minor child should have a right to recover for loss of a parent’s society and companionship caused by a defendant’s culpable conduct. However, I do not agree that the child should recover in a case where the parent’s injury was compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and the statutes accordingly limited the legal liability of the defendant. On this point, I agree with the reasoning of both Justices Quirico and Wilkins in their separate opinions in this case.
*542 I do not agree with the court’s conclusion that there can be recovery for mental suffering and physical impairment by a wife and children who were not at the scene of the accident when it occurred or who did not arrive at the scene of the accident soon thereafter. First of all, in my view Dziokonski is not broad enough to cover this case. On the contrary, the opinion of the court here constitutes a large extension of Dziokonski. That case allows recovery to one who is at the scene when the accident occurs or arrives there soon after the accident. It could be argued that the last paragraph of that opinion contains some rather general language. However, as I read that last paragraph it kept the father’s case alive solely because the allegations were so general as not to preclude him under the principles stated.
Dziokonski is admittedly a somewhat arbitrary cutoff of the limits of culpability. So was the Spade rule. So is the Restatement rule. So, indeed, is the rule of Ferriter, as stated in the court’s opinion. All these are rules of policy designed to limit the great potential reach of the principle of reasonable foreseeability.
Dziokonski, on very compelling facts (mother died in the ambulance while accompanying injured child to hospital), was a modest policy extension of the Restatement policy rule. Not many cases will involve third parties on the scene. The opinion of the court in the instant case has the potential for extending liability of a defendant, in a ripple effect, to extraordinary lengths. This court in recent years has done milch to revise many common law principles which needed change. We should think seriously whether there are any good reasons for extending the defendant’s risk as far as the court’s opinion, and its implications, do in this case.
I take some comfort that the majority of the Justices may have recognized some of my concerns by the emphasis in the court’s opinion that the plaintiffs must show that they suffered physical impairment caused by the mental suffering, and that the plaintiffs must suffer their mental shock “immediately after the accident” or “closely on the heels of the accident.”