finding that “[o]nce the willful violation [has] occurred, the damage [has been] done.”
How later courts described this case
- finding that “[o]nce the willful violation [has] occurred, the damage [has been] done.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER, dissenting:
I must dissent from the opinion of the majority. Contrary to the majority’s holding, the hearing officer applied the wrong standard of proof when he held that the Board’s determination of irremediability was not to be reversed “unless the finding is manifestly against the weight of the evidence.” The standard of proof required of the Board is clearly enunciated in Board of Education v. Ingels (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 334 , 394 N.E.2d 69 . In Ingels, the hearing officer had held that the Board had to prove the charges against the teacher by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, the court held “It was not incumbent upon the School Board to offer clear and convincing evidence, but only proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” ( 75 Ill. App. 3d 334, 337 , 394 N.E.2d 69, 71 .) It is clear, therefore, that the hearing officer must determine whether the Board proved its charges by a preponderance of the evidence, not whether its initial finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In other words, the determination is to be made by the hearing officer from facts presented at the hearing and is not a review of some prior determination of the Board. Because the wrong standard was applied, the resulting finding was invalid. (Board of Education v. Ingels.) Since the finding was invalid, and I do not believe, contrary to the majority’s opinion, that the only possible finding is that the plaintiff’s actions were irremediable, I would reverse and remand.