explaining that a “prosecutor need not negate every reasonable theory consistent with innocence” to prove the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt
How later courts described this case
- explaining that a “prosecutor need not negate every reasonable theory consistent with innocence” to prove the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt
- explaining that, when addressing the -2- sufficiency of the evidence, reviewing courts must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict
- stating that a reviewing court is “required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict”
- explaining that “[t]he repeal of a statute revives the common-law rule as it was before the statute was enacted”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Cavanagh, J.
I concur with the majority’s determination that the defendant’s felony-murder convictions should be reinstated. Further, I agree with the majority that arson is a general intent crime rather than a specific intent crime, and that CJI2d 31.2(4) is misleading. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there was *411 sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant intended to ignite the fumes in his apartment.
When faced with a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Jaffray, 445 Mich 287, 296 ; 519 NW2d 108 (1994). In felony-murder cases, courts consider both whether murder has been committed and whether an underlying, enumerated felony has been committed. See, generally, People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672 ; 299 NW2d 304 (1980). I agree with the majority that, in order to convict a defendant of felony murder, it must be shown that (1) he killed a human being, (2) that he acted with the intent to kill, the intent to inflict great bodily harm, or with a wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of his behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm, and (3) that the killing occurred while the defendant was committing, attempting to commit,. or assisting with the commission of an underlying felony. Ante at 401-402.
The first element in a felony-murder charge is a “ ‘killing of a human being.’ ” Id. at 401. Here, it is undisputed that two human beings were killed. The second element of a felony-murder charge is whether the defendant possessed the requisite mens rea for murder. I would hold that the defendant possessed the requisite mens rea because, by filling his apartment with gas fumes, he created a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with the knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the result.
*412 The defendant argues that, even if it can be shown that he allowed gas fumes to fill his apartment, he was attempting only to commit suicide. As such, he did not possess the requisite intent for the crime of murder. I disagree. The defendant’s experiences working in an appliance store provided him with knowledge about the dangerous properties of gas fumes. Further, the defendant left a note on the door advising his former girlfriend not to turn on any switches. Arguably, the defendant’s note illustrates an attempt to prevent an explosion. However, even under such an assumption, the note also illustrates the defendant’s knowledge that there was a high risk of a dangerous explosion that could cause death or great bodily harm. When taken in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence supports a rational finding by the trier of fact that the defendant possessed the mens rea necessary for murder. Therefore, it becomes necessary to examine whether the defendant committed a statutorily enumerated underlying felony.
The underlying felony in the present case is arson. I agree with the majority that this Court must examine the common-law definition of arson in order to resolve the sufficiency challenge. Thus, we are bound to determine whether the defendant wilfully or maliciously and voluntarily burned the dwelling house of another. People v Reeves, 448 Mich 1, 3-4 ; 528 NW2d 160 (1995). I further agree with the majority that the mens rea necessary for arson can be established either by proving (1) that the defendant intended to commit the actus reus, or (2) by proving that the defendant intentionally committed an act that created a very high risk of burning a dwelling house. Ante at 409. Michigan law defines malice as “an intent to *413 cause the very harm that results or some harm of the same general nature, or an act done in wanton or wilful disregard of the plain and strong likelihood that some such harm will result.” People v Hansen, 368 Mich 344, 350 ; 118 NW2d 422 (1962). Unlike the majority, however, I would not conclude that the defendant intentionally ignited the fumes in his apartment. Rather, I would hold that the defendant intended to fill his apartment with gas fumes, and that the act of releasing the fumes created a very high risk of harm of burning a dwelling house.
When reviewing the sufficiency challenge in the present case, the Court of Appeals was unpersuaded that the defendant intentionally ignited the gas fumes in his apartment. Instead, the Court opined that, while a jury could have rationally concluded that the defendant purposefully filled his apartment with the gas, the jury could not have rationally concluded that the defendant intended to ignite the fumes. The Court then reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the defendant did not possess the specific intent required for the arson underlying the felony-murder charge. Conversely, the majority opines that the Court of Appeals erred by treating arson as a specific intent crime rather than a general intent crime, and by concluding that there was insufficient evidence of intentional ignition. Ante at 395, 398.
I agree with the majority that there was a flaw in the Court of Appeals determination that a specific intent to bum was required. However, I decline to join the majority because our determination that common-law arson is a general intent crime makes it unnecessary to resolve the dispute over whether the defendant intentionally ignited the fumes in his apart *414 ment. I agree with the Court of Appeals that, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the expert testimony established: “(1) that defendant purposefully filled his apartment with natural gas; (2) that the explosion and fire were caused by the ignition of the gas build-up; and (3) that the explosion originated in defendant’s apartment.” Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 9, 1998 (Docket No. 196655). When the Court of Appeals conclusions are examined in a general intent framework, the defendant’s convictions must be reinstated. I would conclude that the defendant acted in wanton or wilful disregard of the plain and strong likelihood that the burning of another’s dwelling house was likely to result from his decision to fill his apartment with gas fumes. Because the defendant acted “maliciously and voluntarily,” and because the evidence demonstrates that the defendant committed the underlying arson even if he did not act intentionally, I find it unnecessary to speculate about whether the fumes were intentionally ignited.
Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.