Opinion

Mieher v. Brown

  • 54 Ill. 2d 539
  • 301 N.E.2d 307
  • 1973 Ill. LEXIS 368
Court
Illinois Supreme Court
Filed
Jun 4, 1973
Status
Published
Author
Goldenhersh
On the bench
Ryan, Goldenhersh
Cited by
156 cases

arguing that the duty of care should extend to prevent unreason- able risk to occupants, other drivers, and pedestrians

How later courts described this case

  • arguing that the duty of care should extend to prevent unreason- able risk to occupants, other drivers, and pedestrians
  • "in retrospect almost nothing is entirely unforeseeable”
  • reversing 3 Ill.App.3d 802, 278 N.E.2d 869
  • “It is apparent that the concept of duty in negligence cases is very involved, complex and indeed nebulous.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Fink v. Chrysler Motors Corp., Inc., 16 Ill. App. 3d 886 (1974)

    Likewise, the recent case of Mieher v. Brown, 54 Ill.2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307, is also distinguishable from the present case.
    Appellate Court of IllinoisJan 25, 1974Read it

The opinion

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting:

The majority have correctly concluded that the rationale of Larsen and the cases which follow it is that since injury-producing impacts are foreseeable “the manufacturer is under a duty to design its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of collision.” The question in this case, however, does not, as stated by the majority, involve the duty of the manufacturer to design a vehicle “with which it is safe to collide.” The question involved is the extent of the duty of the manufacturer to design its vehicle so as to avoid the unreasonable risk of injury in the event of collision, whether the injured be a passenger in that vehicle, another vehicle, a pedestrian, or a bystander.

Upon a close reading of the opinion it appears to me that the majority recognize that the duty owed by the manufacturer is to design his vehicle so as to avoid the unreasonable risk of injury in the event of collision irrespective of whether the injured is within or without the particular vehicle, and insofar as the opinion so holds, I concur. I do not agree, however, that the amended complaint, upon the facts alleged, fails to state a cause of action against the manufacturer, and I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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