Opinion

Riley v. State

  • 711 N.E.2d 489
  • 1999 Ind. LEXIS 306
  • 1999 WL 322994
Court
Indiana Supreme Court
Filed
May 11, 1999
Status
Published
Author
Sullivan
On the bench
Boehm, Dickson, Selby, Shepard, Sullivan
Cited by
44 cases

finding evidence that defendant was familiar with drug jargon and prices, that he engaged in multiple transactions, and that he undertook to arrange future transactions was sufficient to show that defendant was predisposed to dealing in controlled substances and was not entrapped, supporting his conviction for cocaine dealing

How later courts described this case

  • finding evidence that defendant was familiar with drug jargon and prices, that he engaged in multiple transactions, and that he undertook to arrange future transactions was sufficient to show that defendant was predisposed to dealing in controlled substances and was not entrapped, supporting his conviction for cocaine dealing
  • acknowledging that while the generally accepted procedure in answering a jury’s question on a matter of law is to reread all instructions in order to avoid emphasizing any particular point, departure from this procedure is permitted when the jury question coincides with a legal lacuna in the final instructions
  • stating generally accepted procedure in answering jury's question on matter of law is to reread all instructions to avoid emphasizing any particular point and not to qualify, modify, or explain instructions in any way
  • finding that legislature intended to use entire weight of substance “as this encompasses the common understanding of those in the drug trade”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

SULLIVAN, Justice,

concurring and dissenting.

I concur in the majority’s opinion except for its resolution of the claim discussed under the caption, “Insufficient Evidence of Dealing-in Purported Controlled Substance.”

The defendant stands convicted of Dealing in a Substance Represented to Be a Controlled Substance. Ind.Code § 35-48-4-4.5(a)(1) (1993). To secure a conviction on this charge, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally delivered or financed the delivery of a substance that, while not a controlled substance or prescription drug, was “expressly or impliedly represented to he a controlled substance.” Id. (emphasis supplied).

As the majority acknowledges, the defendant did not tell the undercover police officer that he was selling cocaine but “bogeyman,” a substance that resembles but is not cocaine. The defendant did not represent the substance to be a controlled substance. Rather, the defendant expressly represented that the substance was “bogeyman,” which is not a controlled substance. The evidence does not support conviction on this charge.

SHEPARD, C.J., concurs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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