holding that a prosecutor's desire to increase the chances of conviction by adding a burglary charge before the defendant's third trial on a rape *707 charge was "perfectly permissible" and within the prosecutor's broad discretion
How later courts described this case
- holding that a prosecutor's desire to increase the chances of conviction by adding a burglary charge before the defendant's third trial on a rape *707 charge was "perfectly permissible" and within the prosecutor's broad discretion
- noting, in charges of rape and burglary, “[t]he State may prove identity by showing that the similarities between the two crimes are so strong and the method so clearly unique that it is highly probable that the perpetrator of both is the same person”
- highlighting the dangers of letting a jury convict and deprive someone of his rights based solely on inferences of bad character and past mistakes
- addressing the modus operandi exception to rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence in a rape prosecution
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GIVAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. I believe the majority places too stringent a restriction upon evidence of prior similar offenses. The other offenses allowed in evidence in this case were very similar to other offenses allowed in the case of Watts v. State (1950), 229 Ind. 80, 102-03 , 95 N.E.2d 570, 579-80 . In that case this Court reviewed the guidelines necessary for the introduction of prior crimes and held that evidence of six acts of rape or attempted rape occurring over a period of two and one-half years was admissible to show intent, motive, purpose, identification or common scheme and plan.
In the case at bar, the manner in which appellant is alleged to have accomplished the rapes or attempted rapes is clearly sufficient to support one or several of the above exceptions to the rule of inadmissibility.
I would therefore affirm the trial court.
PIVARNIK, J., concurs.