holding that, while this Court is not required to accept “bald allegations of excessiveness[,]” a claim that a sentence is excessive is not “per se precluded from receiving appellate review” and will be reviewed where the “Rule 2119(f) statement sufficiently articulates the manner in which the sentence violates either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process”
How later courts described this case
- holding that, while this Court is not required to accept “bald allegations of excessiveness[,]” a claim that a sentence is excessive is not “per se precluded from receiving appellate review” and will be reviewed where the “Rule 2119(f) statement sufficiently articulates the manner in which the sentence violates either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process”
- holding that a substantial question exists only where the appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement sufficiently articulates the manner in which the sentence violates either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the sentencing code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process
- stating that a substantial question is raised when a defendant “sufficiently articulates the manner in which the sentence violates either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process”
- stating that bald allegations of excessiveness, where appellant has not provided plausible argument that sentence is contrary to Sentencing Code or fundamental norms underlying sentencing process, does not raise substantial question
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice EAKIN,
dissenting.
The majority states the Superior Court relies on cases that hold “a claim of excessiveness that is raised against a sentence within the statutory limits fails to raise a substantial question as a matter of law.” Proposed Opinion, at 623. I do not think that is the holding below, and therefore must offer my dissent.
Neither this case nor other Superior Court jurisprudence holds that every sentence within the statutory maximum is unreviewable. It holds that if the discretionary aspects of a sentence are to be reviewed (i.e., a substantial question about the sentence has been raised), one must in fact offer some specificity. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); see also Commonwealth v. Rodda, 723 A.2d 212, 214 (Pa.Super.1999)(“We will be inclined to recognize a substantial question where an appellant ad *440 vanees a colorable argument that the trial court’s actions are inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process”). Commonwealth v. Dungan, 372 Pa.Super. 323 , 539 A.2d 817, 826 (1988) (“[W]e must determine whether appellant has presented a suitable ‘statement of question’ by brief reasons indicating a ‘substantial question’ exists____”) (emphasis is added; citation omitted). Merely alleging the sentence was “manifestly excessive” or referring to the “magnitude of digression” from the guidelines, is near to boilerplate. See Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 544 Pa. 158 , 675 A.2d 268, 277 (1996)(emphasis added) (“Appellant’s boilerplate assertion that he should be resentenced simply because the trial court sentenced him outside the Sentencing Guidelines without more does not present a substantial question”); Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508 , 522 A.2d 17, 20 (1987)(“It is only where a party can articulate reasons why a particular sentence raises doubts that this scheme as a whole has been compromised [sentencing guidelines] that the appellate court should review the matter....”); Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 964 (Pa.Super.2002)(emphasis added) (“[A] bald allegation that a sentence is excessive does not raise a substantial question”). That is all appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement does. Referring to “all the circumstances” is not to enumerate those circumstances or explain why they give reason to undo the sound discretion of the sentencing court. This is conclusion, not explanation.
The obligation lies with the challenging party to say why that sentence is manifestly excessive — failure to do so is failure to raise a substantial question. Accordingly, while my colleagues offer an analysis with which I cannot disagree, I believe there is a misapprehension of the Superior Court’s decision.
Justice CASTILLE joins this dissenting opinion.