holding that, despite the deferential nature of judicial review of agency adjudications, “review for capricious disregard of material, competent evidence” is necessary to “assure that the agency adjudication has been conducted within lawful boundaries— [but] it is not to be applied in such a manner as would intrude upon the agency’s ... discretionary decision-making authority”
How later courts described this case
- holding that, despite the deferential nature of judicial review of agency adjudications, “review for capricious disregard of material, competent evidence” is necessary to “assure that the agency adjudication has been conducted within lawful boundaries— [but] it is not to be applied in such a manner as would intrude upon the agency’s ... discretionary decision-making authority”
- holding that “review for capricious disregard of material, competent evidence is an appropriate component of appellate consideration in every case in which such question is properly brought before the court.”
- noting that adoption of reasoned decision requirement evidences General Assembly's intention that appellate review be conducted in manner "that ensures that the agency has not exceeded its fact-finding role or the outer limits of its discretion"
- defining capricious disregard as a “deliberate disregard of competent evidence which one of ordinary intelligence could not possibly have avoided in reaching a result”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ZAPPALA, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. Simply put, the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) credited the testimony offered by Employer regarding the nature of Claimant’s duties and found the testimony of Claimant and her medical expert incredible. Having found that Employer’s evidence rebutted the factual predicate upon which Claimant’s medical expert based his opinion, the WCJ concluded that Claimant failed to sustain her burden of proving that she suffered carpal tunnel syndrome during the course and scope of her employment. Thus, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board and the Commonwealth Court erred in awarding workers’ compensation benefits based on the ground that the WCJ capriciously disregarded Claimant’s medical evidence. The fact that Employer presented factual evidence as opposed to medical evidence does not alter the analysis.
As to the application of the capricious disregard standard in the appropriate case, I would adhere to the case law holding that such standard applies only where the party with the *206 burden of proof is the sole party to present evidence, yet does not prevail before the fact finder. See Russel v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 121 Pa.Cmwlth. 436 , 550 A.2d 1364 (1988) (holding that if no evidence was presented to support the prevailing party, there is no evidence upon which to apply the “substantial evidence” test and therefore the “capricious disregard” standard applies). The majority finds difficulty with this approach and states that “it is troubling to suggest that the General Assembly intended for judicial review to be simply unavailable in an instance in which substantial evidence supported the agency’s factual findings, but where it was clear beyond doubt that its conclusions were based upon capricious disregard of other evidence.” Majority opinion at 13. I do not share this concern because if substantial evidence exists to support the factual findings of the WCJ, the appellate tribunal should not delve into whether the WCJ capriciously disregarded “other evidence.”
I also do not view this Court’s decision in Fraternal Order of Police v. PLRB, 557 Pa. 586 , 735 A.2d 96 (1999), as altering the capricious disregard standard. The majority concedes that Fraternal Order of Police did not involve such standard, but rather addressed the “in accordance with law” standard of review of administrative decisions. Majority opinion at 14. Finally, I would refrain from expanding the application of the capricious disregard standard, even on a limited basis, in a case where the factual predicate does not warrant it. 1
. The majority specifically holds that "review for capricious disregard of material, competent evidence is an appropriate component of appellate consideration in every case in which such question is properly brought before the court.” Majority opinion at 15. I believe that such questions are only “properly before the court” when the party with the burden of proof is the sole party to present evidence, yet loses before the fact finder.