holding court’s failure to credit husband for one-half fair rental value of marital residence was not abuse of discretion even though husband voluntarily and generously paid mortgages and expenses of marital home in excess of court - 14 - J-A22038-16 ordered amount for period of ten years; trial court’s ultimate equitable distribution award reflected consideration of factors under Section 3502(a) and was supported by record; trial court’s overall distribution scheme of 50/50 division of marital assets was equitable
How later courts described this case
- holding court’s failure to credit husband for one-half fair rental value of marital residence was not abuse of discretion even though husband voluntarily and generously paid mortgages and expenses of marital home in excess of court - 14 - J-A22038-16 ordered amount for period of ten years; trial court’s ultimate equitable distribution award reflected consideration of factors under Section 3502(a) and was supported by record; trial court’s overall distribution scheme of 50/50 division of marital assets was equitable
- where court extended deadline to file statement and miscommunication between court and parties resulted in failure to file 1925(b) statement, issues still addressed on appeal on strength of 1925(a) opinion
- “There is no requirement . . . that mandates additional evidence before the trial court undertakes reconsideration of its order.”
- credit denied where payments were voluntary and credit would result in economic injustice.
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Otero, 2004 Pa. Super. 390 (2004)
¶ 13 Clearly, Middleton is inapplicable to this case.
The opinion
Concurring
JOYCE, J.:
¶ 1 I agree with the Majority’s ultimate resolution of the equitable distribution issues and the absence of waiver under the unique circumstances of the case at bar. However, I am compelled to write separately to express my concerns over the Majority’s discussion of waiver and Pa. R.A.P.1925(b) statements.
¶ 2 Put simply, the instant case presents a situation where the trial court extended the period of time in which a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement could be filed, and as a result, it is proper in this instance for our Court to decline to find waiver. The Majority’s lengthy discussion and examples of situations where waiver may or may not exist pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) is unnecessary and could cause confusion among the bench and bar.
¶ 3 The procedural history of the case at bar as it relates to Pa.R.A.P.1925 is unique, but it does not however, create a new rule. The law of this Commonwealth remains as it was succinctly set forth by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415 , 719 A.2d 306 (1998). Lord made it clear that failing to timely file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to 1925(b), when ordered to do so by the trial court, renders issues not raised therein waived on appeal. Since the Majority Opinion could be interpreted to stand in contrast to Lord , I concur in the result only.
¶ 4 FORD ELLIOTT, STEVENS and ORIE MELVIN, JJ., join.