declining to impose a duty upon a tennis club to maintain a defibrillator on its premises, principally on the ground that the legislature has carefully regulated the use of such devices without imposing a duty on business operators to maintain such equipment
How later courts described this case
- declining to impose a duty upon a tennis club to maintain a defibrillator on its premises, principally on the ground that the legislature has carefully regulated the use of such devices without imposing a duty on business operators to maintain such equipment
- holding that tennis club owed no duty to tennis club member who suffered heart attack while playing tennis to acquire and maintain a defibrillator on its premises for emergency use
- declining to impose a duty on club to maintain defibrillator on its premises, principally on the ground that legislature carefully regulated use of such devices without imposing a duty on business operators to maintain such equipment
- analyzing the overall public interest in the proposed solution and finding that a tennis club did not owe a duty to acquire and maintain an automated external defibrillator on its premises for emergency use
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice NIGRO,
dissenting.
While I do not necessarily disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a tennis club does not owe a duty to its members to acquire and maintain an automated external defibrillator (“AED”) on its premises for emergency use, that issue is not before us here. The only issue that the Superior Court considered below was whether the Emergency Medical Services Act, 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 6921-6938, and the Department of Health regulations promulgated pursuant to that Act specifically prohibited Appellants from using an AED. Concluding that they did not, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellants on the basis of those authorities. Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 766 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa.Super.2001) (“[Ajlthough we make no finding on the ultimate merits of [plaintiffs’] claim, we find that the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting [defendant’s] motion for summary judgment on the basis of the statutes and regulations cited.”) As I agree with the Superior Court’s conclusion in that regard, I would affirm the Superior Court’s order and remand the case to the trial court to consider in the first instance whether there is any basis on which to conclude that Appellants owed a duty to Appellees.
Mr. Justice SAYLOR joins the dissenting opinion.