“ ... [B]oth Taylor and Beatty involved the application of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110 and the compulsory joinder rule of Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 3172, 41 L.Ed.2d 1139 (1974) (“Campana II"). Neither case purported to deal with the constitutional protections of the double jeopardy clause as applicable to summary offenses.”
How later courts described this case
- “ ... [B]oth Taylor and Beatty involved the application of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110 and the compulsory joinder rule of Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 3172, 41 L.Ed.2d 1139 (1974) (“Campana II"). Neither case purported to deal with the constitutional protections of the double jeopardy clause as applicable to summary offenses.”
- “Our legislature has created a separate legal system for the adjudication of juvenile offenders.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MONTEMURO, Judge,
concurring statement:
While I agree with the Majority’s ultimate resolution of appellant’s claim, I write separately to express my belief *588 that because of the singular focus of this case on the interaction between juvenile and criminal courts in relation to double jeopardy, those prior cases which involve only the criminal system, viz., Commonwealth v. LaBelle, 397 Pa.Super. 179 , 579 A.2d 1315 (1990) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Evers, 381 Pa.Super. 568 , 554 A.2d 531 (1989), are in fact jurisdictionally and factually irrelevant. As the Act makes clear, delinquency specifically excludes summary offenses. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. Therefore, unlike the situation obtaining in the cited cases, joinder was understood to be an impossibility.