applying the holding in Hett, 113 Ill. 2d at 82, that “the State’s right to question prospective jurors as to their views regarding the imposition of the death penalty as provided under Witherspoon does not come into effect when a defendant waives jury sentencing prior to trial”
How later courts described this case
- applying the holding in Hett, 113 Ill. 2d at 82, that “the State’s right to question prospective jurors as to their views regarding the imposition of the death penalty as provided under Witherspoon does not come into effect when a defendant waives jury sentencing prior to trial”
- finding no potential Edwards violation when suspect submitted to a polygraph after speaking with family members who were asked by officers to “find out ... what actually happened”
- concluding any Doyle violation was harmless where “the prosecutor made no further reference to the defendant’s request for an attorney and it was not argued as evidence”
- stating the “[d]efendant’s attempt to impeach [a witness] with a written statement of [another] was improper”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join the court in affirming the defendant’s convictions. I do not agree, however, that the defendant’s death sentence must be vacated, and accordingly I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion.
In the present case, the defendant’s eligibility for the death sentence was predicated solely on the aggravating circumstance found in section 9 — l(b)(7) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-l(b)(7)). That provision authorizes imposition of the death penalty in cases in which “the murdered individual was under 12 years of age and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.” In People v. Odle (1988), 128 Ill. 2d 111 , this court considered, on its own motion, whether section 9 — l(b)(7) was unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Maynard v. Cartwright (1988), 486 U.S. 356 , 100 L. Ed. 2d 372 , 108 S. Ct. 1853 . Odle ruled that the Illinois provision was valid. Discussing the requirements of the statute, the court emphasized: “the victim must be under the age of 12, and the conduct which brings about the victim’s death must not only be exceptionally brutal or heinous, it must also be such that it is indicative of wanton cruelty.” (Emphasis in original.) (Odle, 128 Ill. 2d at 141 .) Recently we reaffirmed Odie, holding once again that section 9 — l(b)(7) is not facially invalid. People v. Kidd (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 432, 454-56 .
Relying on Odie and Kidd, the majority rejects the defendant’s argument before this court that section 9— 1(b)(7) is unconstitutional on its face. The majority also rejects the defendant’s related contention that the death sentence imposed in the present case was rendered unreviewable by the trial judge’s failure to provide written findings, or some other express statement, regarding his application of the statutory aggravating circumstance. Having determined in Odle and Kidd that section 9— 1(b)(7) is constitutional, the narrow question in this case is whether the sentencing judge properly found that the aggravating circumstance had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority agrees with the defendant that the provision was not established here.
In explicating the terms “brutal,” “heinous,” and “wanton cruelty,” the majority turns to People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482 . That case considered identical language appearing in section 5 — 8—1(a)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—1(a)(1)), which authorizes the imposition of a term of natural life imprisonment when the offense of murder is accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. Citing Odie and People v. Mitchell (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 1 , which involved imposition of an extended term of imprisonment for the offense of aggravated battery of a child (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.2(b)(2) (extended term may be imposed if felony “was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty”)), the majority states, “Cases in which this court has found brutal or heinous behavior to be present have generally involved prolonged pain, torture or premeditation.” (132 Ill. 2d at 445.) The majority concludes that the evidence in this case fails to support the trial judge’s finding that the defendant’s murder of the seven-month-old victim came within the scope of section 9— 1(b)(7). In support of its holding the majority notes that the victim’s death was caused by suffocation, “which occurred almost immediately after the injuries were inflicted,” and that there was testimony indicating that the injuries could have been the result of a single blow. The majority then states that there was no “conclusive evidence” that the victim’s death was premeditated, prolonged, or torturous. 132 Ill. 2d at 446.
As noted, the majority declares that in cases involving exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty, the conduct in question has generally involved prolonged pain, torture, or premeditation. The majority’s formulation may be questioned. In La Pointe the court rejected the defendant’s argument that behavior of the type described is found only in cases involving torture or the infliction of unnecessary pain; in reaching that conclusion, the court relied on the same definitions of the terms “heinous” and “brutal” that are cited by the majority here. (La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d at 501 .) Although the court in La Pointe went on to describe the offense committed in that case as premeditated, it cannot be said that the court intended for that observation to additionally restrict the application of those terms.
Assuming, however, that the majority is correct in its judgment that the statutory aggravating circumstance provided by section 9 — l(b)(7) requires proof of prolonged pain, torture, or premeditation, I would conclude that the necessary conduct was shown here. The medical evidence introduced at the defendant’s sentencing hearing established that the seven-month-old victim, Danny, was first struck against an object and then smothered; the cause of the child’s death was determined to be suffocation. According to the pathologist who performed the autopsy, the victim had contusions around his mouth and nose, apparently resulting from suffocation. The child also had incurred a small hematoma on the upper chest, a hematoma on the head, a small contrecoup injury to the brain, a mild hemorrhage in the myocardium, a hematoma in the left lung, and a bruised thymus. In addition to those injuries, the lobes of the child’s liver had separated, and his left arm was broken. The pathologist believed that the defendant had swung the child’s body into a hard object while holding him by the arm. Referring to Danny’s broken arm, the pathologist explained:
“That most probably, my opinion is that it was the pivotal point, that the baby was held up by the arm. And while to some extent the lower third of the humerus was held immobile, the body kept moving and came in contact with the hard surface, and this resulted in a fracture of the humerus and the injuries to the remaining body.”
The force of the impact caused the child’s liver to rupture. The defendant then smothered the victim, causing his death.
Although the child’s suffering might not have been prolonged, it clearly was torturous. I note also the evidence suggesting that the defendant’s conduct in the present case may have been premeditated, which would further support a finding under the standard formulated by the majority. Danny had previously suffered a broken arm while in the defendant’s care, and other evidence indicated that the defendant resented the child. As the court correctly holds, the evidence of the defendant’s prior conduct toward the victim was admissible at trial because it tended to show motive and intent. By the same token, that evidence suggests the- deliberate, if not premeditated, nature of the defendant’s behavior in causing the child’s death. In light of the victim’s age, the nature and extent of his injuries, and the defendant’s conduct in causing the child’s death, I would conclude that the requirements of section 9 — 1(b)(7) were satisfied here. Because I find no merit in the defendant’s remaining contentions, I would affirm the sentences imposed, as well as the convictions.