“In construing a statute, this Court must discern the intent of the -12- Legislature in enacting the relevant provision” by first looking “to the language of the statute itself. After considering the language and general scope of the act, we may determine legislative intent in light of the purpose it seeks to accomplish or the evil it seeks to remedy.”
How later courts described this case
- “In construing a statute, this Court must discern the intent of the -12- Legislature in enacting the relevant provision” by first looking “to the language of the statute itself. After considering the language and general scope of the act, we may determine legislative intent in light of the purpose it seeks to accomplish or the evil it seeks to remedy.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). The no-fault automobile liability act abolishes tort liability respecting an insured vehicle except for noneconomic loss greater than the statutory threshold: death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement. 1 _
*467 The question presented is whether a person who suffers noneconomic loss less than the statutory threshold caused by the negligent use of an uninsured vehicle may recover under the uninsured motorist coverage of an automobile insurance policy.
The majority holds that the act abolishes tort liability for noneconomic loss below the statutory threshold without regard to whether the vehicle is insured. We would hold that tort liability is not abolished as to an uninsured vehicle and that the defendant may recover from his insurer under the uninsured motorist coverage.
Subsection (2) of § 3135 of the act, stating that tort liability is abolished as to an insured vehicle, and subsection (1), stating that an owner remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss "only” if a loss greater than the threshold has occurred,* 2 should be read together and harmonized. Subsection (2) speaks specifically to the question whether an owner of an uninsured vehicle is relieved of tort liability, and states that he is not. That specific provision should and can be given effect by regarding the language of subsection (1) (providing that a person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss only if a greater than threshold *468 injury has occurred) as applicable only where tort liability has been abolished as provided in subsection (2).
Only those — insureds—whose tort liability has been abolished under subsection (2) could have liability for noneconomic loss that "remains” under subsection (1). Persons whose tort liability has not been abolished — uninsureds—could not have liability that "remains.” A person not within the intendment or scope of subsection (2) (abolishing tort liability) is not within the intendment or scope of subsection (1) (liability for noneconomic loss that remains); an uninsured is not within the intendment or scope of subsection (2) and hence is not within the intendment or scope of subsection (1).
The no-fault act, as this Court has observed, 3 is modeled on the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act which expressly, 4 and on examination of the commentary 5 clearly, provides — more *469 clearly we agree than the Michigan act — that the provision of the act abolishing tort liability does not apply to the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle involved in an accident.
It may seem incongruous that an injured person who has uninsured motorist coverage may recover for below the threshold noneconomic loss when the driver of the other vehicle was at fault and the vehicle was uninsured, while no recovery below the threshold may be obtained if the other vehicle was insured. Such incongruity is the result of the language of the uninsured motorist rider to the injured person’s automobile insurance and does not justify the majority’s construction of the no-fault act to correct this possible incongruity in the underwriting of uninsured motorist coverage. 6
*470 Our attention has been directed by the parties to statements in Bradley v Mid-Century Ins, 409 Mich 1, 62 ; 294 NW2d 141 (1980), and Citizens Ins Co v Tuttle, 411 Mich 536, 546-547 ; 309 NW2d 174 (1981). Neither the statement in Bradley (tending to support the insurer) nor those in Citizens (tending to support the insured) were necessary to decision in those cases, 7 and did not decide the issue in the instant case, an issue of sufficient difficulty to have justified plenary consideration in the instant case by this Court.
We would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.
(1) A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic *467 loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use within this state of a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by section 3101(3) and (4) was in effect is abolished except as to:
(b) Damages for noneconomic loss as provided and limited in subsection (1). [MCL 500.3135(1), (2)(b); MSA 24.13135(1), (2)(b).]
See n 5 of the majority opinion for the complete text.
See Citizens Ins Co v Tuttle, 411 Mich 536, 546 ; 309 NW2d 174 (1981).
(a) Tort liability with respect to accidents occurring in this State and arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle is abolished except as to:
(1) liability of the owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident if security covering the vehicle was not provided at the time of the accident;
(7) damages for noneconomic detriment in excess of [$5,000], but only if the accident causes death, significant permanent injury, serious permanent disfigurement, or more than 6 months of complete inability of the injured person to work in an occupation. "Complete inability of an injured person to work in an occupation” means inability to perform, even on a part-time basis, even some of the duties required by his occupation or, if unemployed' at the time of injury, by any occupation for which the injured person was qualified. [Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, 14 ULA 63, § 5.]
The rationale for denying the tort exemption to persons *469 failing to comply with the requirement of providing security (Section 7) is that such persons have not contributed to the payment of basic reparation benefits which are intended to replace much of existing tort liability. For example, the State is not empowered to require that the United States government post security for the payment of basic reparation benefits. The United States’ obligation to pay the victims of accidents involving government motor vehicles is limited to paying "tort claims, in the same manner, and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances” (28 USC 2674). Under the provisions on security covering the vehicles (Section 7), the United States government may elect to provide security for its vehicles. If the United States provides security, it would be exempt from tort liability. But, under this paragraph, if it elected not to do so, it would continue to be liable in tort "to the same extent as a private individual” who had not complied with the security requirement. This paragraph retains tort liability only for the owner of the unsecured vehicle, since, under the provisions on security covering the vehicle, only the owner is required to furnish such security. The driver of an unsecured vehicle who is not the owner is not liable in tort under the tort action retained by this paragraph. The owner’s vicarious liability under owner-consent statutes or principles of the law of agency is retained, however, as if the driver’s tort liability had been retained as well. [Commissioners’ Comment, 14 ULA 65-66, § 5(a)(1).]
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has held that the § 5(a)(1) thresh *470 old of the umvara does not bar an insured’s action to recover under the uninsured motorist provision of an automobile policy for pain and suffering resulting from injuries sustained in a collision with an automobile negligently driven by an uninsured motorist. Hanover Ins Co v Blincoe, 573 SW2d 930 (Ky App, 1978).
The Supreme Court of North Dakota faced the same issue in Steenson v General Casualty Co, 397 NW2d 461, 462 (ND, 1986). The statute provided:
Secured person exemption.—
1. In any action against a secured person to recover damages because of accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership or operation of a secured motor vehicle in this state, the secured person shall be exempt from liability to pay damages for:
a. Noneconomic loss unless the injury is a serious injury.
The court concluded:
There is nothing expressed in these statutes to suggest that recovery on the uninsured motorist coverage is limited by the threshold requirements of the separate no-fault statute. [Id., p 463.]
Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late. [Henslee v Union Planters Nat’l Bank, 335 US 595, 600 ; 69 S Ct 290 ; 93 L Ed 259 (1949) (dissent of Frankfurter, J.).]