Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno

WAGNER, Chief Judge,

dissenting:

The mere fact that a foreign corporation advertises for business within the District Columbia is insufficient under our long-arm statute for our local court to exercise personal jurisdiction over that corporation for claims unrelated to that advertising which arise wholly in the foreign state. 1 Since the majority appears to hold otherwise, I respectfully dissent. In order for the District of Columbia Courts to properly assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, “service of process over the nonresident must be authorized by statute and be within the confines of the due process clause of the United States Constitution.” Cohane v. Arpeja-California, Inc., 385 A.2d 153, 158 (D.C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 , 99 S.Ct. 567 , 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). The statutory provisions at issue here are D.C.Code §§ 13-423(a)(1) and -423(b) (long-arm statute). 2 There is no real dispute in this case that Shoppers Food Warehouse’s (Shoppers’) advertisements for customers within the District were sufficient minimum activities to meet the “transacting business” requirement of § 423(a)(1). See Trerotola v. Cotter, 601 A.2d 60, 63 (D.C.1991) (citing Cohane, 385 A.2d at 158 ). 3 *338 What divides the court is whether the further condition imposed by § 13-423(b) is satisfied. I agree with my dissenting colleagues that it is not. Section 423(b) bars the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation where the claim is unrelated to the business transacted in the District by the corporation. See Trerotola, 601 A.2d at 63 . In other words, under this section, “jurisdiction is limited to claims arising from the particular transaction of business which provides the basis for jurisdiction.” Cohane, 385 A.2d at 158 (citing D.C.Code § 13-423(b)). Ms. Moreno’s claim arose out of injuries she sustained in an accident which occurred in Shoppers’ Maryland store as a result of Shoppers’ negligent act or omission in the state of Maryland. There is simply no relationship here between Shoppers’ advertisements in the District and Shoppers’ alleged tortious conduct which caused Ms. Moreno to slip and fall in Maryland as required by our statute. To accept the contrary position would render the limitation imposed by § 423(b) a nullity. That we have “interpreted this statute as permitting the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause,” 4 does not eliminate the requirement that the courts of this jurisdiction adhere to the process due under our statute. That process, as set forth in our long-arm statute, provides in § 423(a)(1) and (b) a specific basis for the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. The exercise of that jurisdiction must conform to the statute and be consistent with due process. See Trerotola, 601 A.2d at 64 ; Cohane, 385 A.2d at 158 . Under § 13—423(b), unless the claim “has a discernible relationship to the ‘business’ transacted in the District[,] ... asserted jurisdiction exceeds the limits of the due process clause of the Constitution.” Trerotola, 601 A.2d at 64 (citing Cohane, 385 A.2d at 158 ). Here, there was only the fortuity of Ms. Moreno having an accident in a store in Maryland belonging to Shoppers, a foreign corporation which happens to advertise for customers in a daily newspaper which is distributed in the metropolitan area. Her cause of action neither arises out of, nor is it related to Shoppers’ advertising activities. For these reasons, and essentially for those set forth in Judge Schwelb’s dissenting opinion, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.

. There is no contention in this case that the court’s jurisdiction derives from D.C.Code § 13-334 (1995) (authorizing service upon a foreign corporation doing business in the District of Columbia or transacting business in the District arising out "of contracts entered into or to be performed, in whole or in part, in the District of Columbia or growing out of any tort committed in the District”), or D.C.Code § 13-422 (pertaining to jurisdiction over corporations organized under the laws of, or maintaining a principal place of business in the District, as to any claim).

. The long-arm statute, § 13-423 provides in pertinent part:

(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s -

(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;

(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him.

."Under § 13-423(a)(1), less of a nexus between the defendant and the District of Columbia is required for a finding of jurisdiction than would be required under the ‘doing business’ test used to determine corporate pres *338 ence." Cohane, supra, 385 A.2d at 158 (citation omitted).

. Cohane, supra, 385 A.2d at 158 .