The opinion
Bronson, J.
(concurring). For the most part, I concur in Judge Holbrook’s opinion. However, I write separately to address two issues which I believe are not adequately discussed by the majority. I do this to remove any suggestion that the issues in question have been resolved by this Court in this opinion.
In this case, plaintiffs apparently did not object to the imputation of Joseph George’s negligence to his wife, Josephine. Where distinct causes of action are raised, e.g., where both the plaintiff driver and the plaintiff passenger sue a tortfeasor for their own bodily injuries, the trial court errs in imputing the negligence of the driver to the passenger. See Jackson v Trogan, 364 Mich 148, 158 ; *587 110 NW2d 612 (1961), Paratore v Furst, 15 Mich App 568 ; 167 NW2d 126 (1969), lv den 382 Mich 769 (1969), Earls v Herrick, 107 Mich App 657, 664, fn 2 ; 309 NW2d 694 (1981). This case involves, however, a claim for the wife’s loss of consortium, an action which is derivative of the husband’s. This difference might convince me in a future case in which the issue is argued that the imputation of one spouse’s negligence to the other is proper. On the other hand, although derivative in nature, it is equally true that the spouse’s loss in a consortium action is not occasioned by that party’s own negligence. As such, I might well be persuaded to hold that, even in respect to loss of consortium actions, one spouse’s negligence cannot be imputed to the other. See Note, Torts — Action for Loss of Consortium — Husband’s Contributory Negligence as a Bar, 11 Wayne L Rev 824 (1965), criticizing the idea that the husband’s negligence should be imputed to the wife where loss of consortium is alleged and arguing that a right of consortium is an independent right.
On the facts of this case, I agree with the majority that comparative negligence was not applicable. I raise the imputation of negligence problem, not to resolve it in this case, but only to explicitly note that we need not, and do not, reach this issue here.
I also write separately to indicate that I am not prepared to hold that a plaintiff’s negligence is always inapplicable in a products liability action brought under a warranty theory. As I wrote for this Court in Kujawski v Cohen, 56 Mich App 533, 542 ; 224 NW2d 908 (1974), lv den 394 Mich 772 (1975):
"Contributory negligence, as it is characteristically understood in the common law of negligence, is not a *588 defense to a breach of warranty action. Something more than mere negligence must be shown to bar recovery, something approaching 'assumption of the risk’ or disregard of known danger. Barefield v La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co, 370 Mich 1, 5 ; 120 NW2d 786, 789 (1963); Baker v Rosemurgy, 4 Mich App 195, 200 ; 144 NW2d 660, 663 (1966).” (Emphasis in original.)
Because defendant did not allege this "assumption of risk” type of negligence on plaintiff Joseph George’s part, I concur in the majority’s disposition.
Defendant relies in part on the comparative negligence statute pertaining to products liability cases enacted by the Legislature, MCL 600.2949; MSA 27A.2949, just prior to the decision in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1979) . However, where the underlying facts of the products liability or warranty claim are based on the failure of the defendant to provide a safety device, I agree with the decision in Tulkku v Mackworth Rees Division of Avis Industries, Inc (On Remand), 101 Mich App 709 ; 301 NW2d 46 (1980), Iv den 411 Mich 897 (1981), that MCL 600.2949; MSA 27A.2949 is inapplicable.
I concur in the majority’s result, and, except as otherwise indicated in this opinion, in the majority’s rationale.