concluding that testimony as to the ages and physical characteristics of two victims, their clothing at the time of disappearance, and the last sightings of the victims “demonstrated that each victim was a life in being and was elicited for the purpose of placing the disappearances of the victims in the proper time frame and identifying them by clothing and appearance.”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that testimony as to the ages and physical characteristics of two victims, their clothing at the time of disappearance, and the last sightings of the victims “demonstrated that each victim was a life in being and was elicited for the purpose of placing the disappearances of the victims in the proper time frame and identifying them by clothing and appearance.”
- rejecting claim that a verdict slip that was identical to the form mandated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 358A [renumbered as Pa.R.Crim.P. 808] prevented the jury from considering mitigation evidence presented by the defendant because such evidence was not specifically listed on the form or enumerated in the jury charge
- concluding that the appellant was "not entitled to psychiatric assistance to prove the mental health mitigating circumstances" because future dangerousness was not an issue at trial
- noting that generally, an appellant cannot obtain post-conviction review of a claim that was previously litigated on direct appeal by alleging ineffectiveness of counsel and presenting new theories of relief in support of the previously litigated claim
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SAYLOR, Justice,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion, but write to clarify my views concerning the entitlement of an indigent capital defendant to expert psychiatric assistance. The majority, in dicta, reaffirms this Court’s interpretation in Commonwealth v. Christy that, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, government-funded assistance is mandated only in circumstances where it is required to rebut the Commonwealth’s argument of future dangerousness. While Ake has been interpreted in a similar manner by some other courts, other jurisdictions have found that the federal constitu *525 tional due process principles at issue in Ake support the conferral of assistance in a broader array of circumstances. See, e.g., Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1287 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 995 , 115 S.Ct. 499 , 130 L.Ed.2d 409 (1994); Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 928-29 (11th Cir.1992).
Nevertheless, and regardless of the constitutional dimension to the inquiry, this Court has found that the decision whether to appoint an expert is further subject to appellate review for an abuse of discretion, and that the nature of the case as a capital one is a significant factor in this review. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 537 Pa. 233, 257 , 643 A.2d 61, 73 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1005 , 115 S.Ct. 1317 , 131 L.Ed.2d 198 (1995). In those cases where a legitimate component of the defense to the charge of murder or the Commonwealth’s effort to obtain a sentence of death lies in demonstrating to the jury a claim concerning the defendant’s mental condition, expert psychiatric assistance may be indispensable. In such instances, I believe that it would be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a request for funding, even though the request would not implicate federal constitutional due process concerns as interpreted by Christy. I would thus enforce as mandatory what the majority posits is permissive so that, as the trial court appropriately ensured in the present case, an indigent defendant is provided core resources necessary to present a full and fair defense in all phases of capital litigation.