stating that foreseeability was question of fact for jury
How later courts described this case
- stating that foreseeability was question of fact for jury
- mere fact that Illinois laws regarding wrongful death and survival actions are more liberal than those of Indiana does not demonstrate any public policy of Indiana that would prevent the Illinois laws from being applied
- limiting exception to cases dealing with gaming contracts, lotteries, and marriages between close relatives
- “The Department could not exercise discretion and determine whether or not to maintain custody of Lett, but had to maintain such custody in obedience to the mandate of the Knox Circuit Court without regard to, or the exercise of, its own judgment as to the propriety of so doing.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RATLIFF, Judge,
concurring.
I agree that the substantive law of Illinois applies in this case. However, in reaching this conclusion, I have applied a different legal theory from that employed by the majority. The majority opinion arrives at its decision to apply Illinois substantive law through the application of the traditional conflicts of laiv rule of lex loci delicti. 1 I would prefer to reach this result through application of the so-called “modern rule” or the “most significant relationship” approach 2 espoused by the landmark case of Babcock v. Jackson, (1963) 12 N.Y.2d 473 , 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 , 191 N.E.2d 279 , and adopted by Restatement 2d of Conflict of Laws, § 145.
The traditional rule in conflict of laws cases involving multistate torts has been to apply the substantive law of the place of tort-the lex loci delicti rule. 16 Am.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws, § 98 (1979); 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 12(2)(a) (1967); Annot. *418 29 A.L.R.3d, 603 at 613-14 (1970). Indiana followed this rule in the earlier cases cited in the majority opinion. Wabash Railroad Co. v. Hassett Admr., (1908) 170 Ind. 370 , 83 N.E. 705 ; Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railway Co. v. Reed, (1902) 158 Ind. 25 , 62 N.E. 488 ; Burns, Admr. v. Grand Rapids & Indiana Railroad Co., (1888) 113 Ind. 169 , 15 N.E. 230 . 3
For many years, lex loci delicti was the general rule, and may still be the general rule in multistate tort cases. 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 12(2)(a) (1967); 29 A.L. R.3d 613-14 (1970). Application of the rule of lex loci delicti inflexibly, indiscriminately, and without exception was justified on the ground that such application of the rule promoted certainty, predictability, uniformity of result, and was easy to apply. Babcock v. Jackson, supra ; 16 Am.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws, § 99 (1979). However, many courts and legal scholars questioned the wisdom of the rigid and inflexible application of the traditional rule in all cases regardless of the circumstances of the case. Babcock v. Jackson, supra. 16 Am.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws, §§ 98, 102 (1979). It has been said:
“Dissatisfaction with the mechanical application of the lex loci delicti rule has in recent years led a number of courts to reject that rule completely, and to apply a rule that requires of the forum court analysis of all the facts and factors involved to determine what law is most appropriate, under the particular analytical theory or process employed. While none of the various theories and principles which these courts have applied constitutes a rule for resolving a conflict of laws in the same sense as the rule of lex loci delicti, since each necessarily depends upon a subjective analysis of objective factors, it may fairly be said, despite disagreement among scholars and a lack of uniformity among courts as to how a choice between competing laws is to be made in a multistate tort situation, that a ‘modern rule’ has evolved, that is, there is a duty imposed on the forum court to undertake an analytical approach to the facts presented in a multistate tort action to determine what law should govern the substantive rights of the parties.” (Footnotes omitted.)
16 Am.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws, § 102, at 168-70(1979). (See also: 29 A.L.R.3d 622 -23 (1970): 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 8(4) (1967).
The supposed virtues of certainty, ease of application, and predictability fostered by the inflexible, mechanical application of lex loci delicti to all multistate tort cases came to be viewed as vices in some cases where it was felt the rule led to unjust results. Such a situation gave rise to the landmark case of Babcock v. Jackson, supra. In Bab-cock, a New York plaintiff, Miss Babcock, left Rochester, New York, with friends, Mr. and Mrs. Jackson, also of Rochester, New York, in the friends’ car which was garaged, licensed, and insured in New York for a weekend trip to Ontario, then to return to New York. While in Ontario, the driver, Mr. Jackson, lost control of the car, causing a collision with a stone wall severely injuring Miss Babcock. Babcock sued Jackson on a negligence theory. An Ontario statute provided that the driver was not liable in damages to a non-paying guest for injuries or death. Thus, application of the traditional rule would have denied Babcock a right of action, and, in the view of the New York Court of Appeals produced an *419 anomalous and unjust result. The court wisely rejected lex loci delicti in favor of what it called the “center of gravity” or “grouping of contacts” doctrine saying at 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 , 191 N.E.2d 283 :
“The ‘center of gravity’ or ‘grouping of contacts’ doctrine adopted by this court in conflicts cases involving contracts impresses us as likewise affording the appropriate approach for accommodating the competing interests in tort cases with multi-State contacts. Justice, fairness and ‘the best practical result’ [citation omitted] may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation. The merit of such a rule is that ‘it gives to the place “having the most interest in the problem” paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context’ and thereby allows the forum to apply ‘the policy of the jurisdiction “most intimately concerned with the outcome of [the] particular litigation.” ’ ” (Citation omitted.)
The theory advanced by Babcock is indeed the position adopted by the Restatement 2d of Conflict of Laws, § 145 (1971) which reads:
“(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
“(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
“These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.”
The Appellate Court of this state attempted to reject the traditional rule in Witherspoon v. Salm, (1968) 142 Ind.App. 655 , 237 N.E.2d 116 (superseded by Supreme Court opinion (1969) 251 Ind. 575 , 243 N.E.2d 876 ). In Witherspoon, Judge Carson stated at 142 Ind.App. 667 , 237 N.E.2d 116 :
“There seems to be only one meritorious argument for the inadvertent application of the substantive law of the ‘situs of the wrong.’ That conclusion is that such application would render predictability and stability in the area of conflicts of law.”
And further at 142 Ind.App. 670 , 237 N.E.2d 116 :
“We believe the more logical basis for a choice of conflicting law could be stated: Given a factual and legal situation, involving an actual conflict of law, which state has the greater interest in having its law applied ?” (Original emphasis.)
In reversing Witherspoon, the Supreme Court found there was no issue of whether Indiana or Kentucky law applied. There being no issue of choice of law, it was, of course, unnecessary for the Supreme Court to consider whether the “traditional rule” or the “modern rule” was the proper rule to apply. Although the Appellate Court opinion in Witherspoon may lack precedential value because of the reversal by the Supreme Court, it is, nevertheless, noteworthy in that it clearly points the direction the Appellate Court wanted to go in rejecting lex loci delicti in favor of a more analytical approach.
Cases from the Federal system applying Indiana law have interpreted that law as following the most significant relationship theory in choosing the applicable substantive law in multistate tort situations. Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., (7th Cir. 1965) 342 F.2d 617 ; Gianni v. Fort Wayne Air Service, Inc., (7th Cir. 1965) 342 F.2d 621 . (But see: Bowen v. United States, (7th Cir. 1978) 570 F.2d 1311 , where the court states that the District Court held lex loci delicti to be the rule in Indiana which ruling was *420 not questioned by the plaintiff, yet points out in footnote 18 its own prior rulings in Watts and Gianni.)
I believe the more analytical approaches 4 set forth in Babcock v. Jackson, supra, and Restatement 2d of Conflict of Laws, § 145 should be applied in this case, and that we should reject any further mechanical, inflexible application of lex loci delicti. Under the Restatement or Babcock rule, clearly Illinois law bears the most significant relationship' to the occurrence and parties involved. The deceased was an Illinois resident and was killed in Illinois. Her parents and her representatives are likewise Illinois residents. The persons who will benefit from any recovery are domiciled in Illinois. Clearly, Illinois has the most significant relationship or dominant interest. Therefore, Illinois substantive law applies. But, Illinois law applies because Illinois has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and parties, not because of blind adherence to, and mechanical, inflexible application of, lex loci delicti in all cases, regardless of circumstances. 5
I also concur with the majority in their conclusions concerning the applicability of the Indiana Tort Claims Act. I also believe this result would be reached by application of the “most significant relationship” approach.
Therefore, I concur with the majority’s application of Illinois substantive law in this case. My quarrel with the majority opinion is that it would perpetuate lex loci delicti as an inflexible rule always to be applied in multistate tort cases thereby binding us to an archaic concept which is being abandoned by more and more courts. 6 Although the result would not be changed in this case, blind adherence to lex loci delicti and the mechanical, inflexible application of that doctrine eventually will lead to such an anomalous and unjust result that we will be compelled to repudiate that doctrine. The time is now.
In all other respects, I concur with the majority opinion.
. This rule has been defined as the law of the place of the wrong; the law of the place of the tort; the law of the place of the injury.
. This approach has also been denominated the “center of gravity” approach and the “dominant contacts” approach. 16 Am.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws, § 103 (1979); 15A C.J.S. Conñict of Laws § 8(4) (1967); R.A. Leflar, American Conflict of Laws, 3d Ed., § 136 (1977).
. It is significant that the latest Indiana case cited in support of lex loci delicti as the rule in Indiana was decided in 1908 prior to the controversy concerning the propriety of the rule as an absolute and inflexible legal principle. This disagreement among courts and scholars with the traditional rule is discussed in the ensuing paragraphs of this opinion.
The majority also cites three federal cases from the Northern District of Indiana for the proposition that lex loci delicti is the choice of law rule followed in Indiana. Those cases are Vera Cruz v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., (1961 N.D.Ind.) 192 F.Supp. 958 ; Zirkelbach v. Decatur Cartage Co., (1954 N.D.Ind.) 119 F.Supp. 753 ; and Hellrung v. Lafayette Loan & Trust Co., (1951 N.D.Ind.) 102 F.Supp. 822 . The efficacy of these decisions is at least questionable in the light of Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., (7th Cir. 1965) 342 F.2d 617 , and Gianni v. Fort Wayne Air Service, Inc., (7th Cir. 1965) 342 F.2d 621 , which interpret Indiana law as following the most significant relationship approach. Watts and Gianni are cited later in the body of this opinion.
. In addition to the most significant relationship test, center of gravity, or dominant contacts approach, there are other “modem rule" theories or concepts which have been designated as “governmental interests” approach and “choice-influencing considerations” approach. These approaches and the “most significant relationship” approach are to some extent overlapping. For discussion of all of these approaches see: 16 Am.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws, §§ 103, 105 (1979); Annot. 29 A.L.R.3d 603 , et seq. (1970); R.A. Leflar, American Conflicts of Law, 3d Ed. (1977), §§ 135-138.
. Indeed, in most multistate tort cases, the law of the place of the tort will continue to control. In cases where the conduct and injury are in different states, the law of the state where the injury occurred will generally be applied. This is so because in most cases the place of the tort will have the most dominant interest. 16 Am. Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws, § 107 (1979). Indeed, New York cases following Babcock v. Jackson, supra, have said that lex loci delicti is still the normal rule in most cases. It is the application of that doctrine indiscriminately and without exception that is the evil which the modern rule was designed to avoid. Neumeier v. Kuehner, (1972) 31 N.Y.2d 121 , 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 , 286 N.E.2d 454 .
.As Professor Leflar has said: “A number of American states still follow lex loci delicti in their most recent decisions, though the number of such states decreases every year.” R.A. Leflar, American Conflicts of Law, 3d Ed. (1977) § 132, at 267.