holding that police officer's misconduct in misuse of his gun on a single occasion was sufficiently serious to warrant discharge for cause
How later courts described this case
- holding that police officer's misconduct in misuse of his gun on a single occasion was sufficiently serious to warrant discharge for cause
- determining whether “the agency’s finding of guilt is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence”
- holding unnecessary display of firearm reflected poorly on ability and good judgment of police officer
- an “administrative tribunal’s finding of ‘cause’ for discharge commands our respect, and it is to be overturned only if it is arbitrary and unreasonable or unrelated to the requirements of the service” (citing DeGrazio v. Civil Service Comm’n, 31 Ill. 2d 482, 489, 202 N.E.2d 522 (1964))
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Gorski v. BD. OF FIRE AND POLICE COMM'RS, 357 Ill. Dec. 466 (2011)
Both Walsh and Lynch are distinguishable from this case.
The opinion
JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, dissenting:
After describing as “most reckless and irresponsible” Sergeant Walsh’s actions in shooting at the glass on the floor with others nearby, pointing the cocked and loaded gun at the others, and then shooting Sergeant Smith in the face, the majority finds that “the seriousness of this offense is more than enough to warrant the board’s decision to discharge Sergeant Walsh.” (96 Ill. 2d at 106-07.) The majority also notes that “An administrative tribunal’s finding of ‘cause’ for discharge commands our respect,” and that “considerable deference” must be accorded such findings. (96 Ill. 2d at 106.) With those analyses I could not agree more. But in what seems to me a remarkable non sequitur, the majority then proceeds to vacate the board’s order and remand the cause for further hearings.
This action apparently is taken because a discharge may affect Sergeant Walsh’s pension rights, and the majority believes he is entitled to a second opportunity to establish that the threats and shooting were the result of the psychiatric problems. There is, however, simply no evidence in this record which indicates the shooting was in any way connected with the unspecified and undefined psychiatric problems. Nor is there any indication that additional, more probative evidence can be produced.
A full and complete opportunity was afforded in the original hearing for the introduction of evidence of a causal connection between the shooting and the medical problems. That relationship was not established, and the misconduct was, as the majority states, “more than enough to warrant the board’s decision to discharge Sergeant Walsh.” (96 Ill. 2d at 106-07.) Given the extremely serious and life-threatening nature of the conduct involved here, I see no reason to do other than affirm the board’s action. Sutton v. Civil Service Com. (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 404 ; DeGrazio v. Civil Service Com. (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 482, 489 .
JUSTICE MORAN joins in this dissent.