distinguishing cases involving questionably qualified experts, a social worker’s testimony as to the fact the victim and defendant had sex, and testimony as to the fact a rape actually occurred
How later courts described this case
- distinguishing cases involving questionably qualified experts, a social worker’s testimony as to the fact the victim and defendant had sex, and testimony as to the fact a rape actually occurred
- allowing opinion testimony that child victim’s allegations were truthful
- allowing opinion testimony that victim's allegations were truthful
- testimony offered to inform the jury of the characteristics displayed by one sexually abused did not reach an ultimate fact and did not invade the province of the jury and therefore met the requirements in the Frye test
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
In its treatment of State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D.1985); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923); and People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d 236 , 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 , 681 P.2d 291 (1984), the majority unduly strains to support inadmissible and prejudicial expert testimony. The majority strains as follows:
The testimony of Dr. Curran oh rape trauma syndrome does not violate the mandate of Frye in the setting of a criminal trial for the sexual abuse of a child. The testimony was offered merely to inform the jury of the characteristics which may be displayed by one who has been sexually abused. The testimony *280 did not reach an ultimate fact and did not invade the province of the jury, but rather was designed to assist it in making its decision. We thus hold that the testimony of Dr. Curran on rape trauma syndrome met the requirements set forth in Frye.
(Emphasis added). This testimony was also offered to establish credibility. In fact, the State argued that it needed this testimony to show that the girls were “reliable” since the children’s testimony needed an “even break.” The State admits the experts’ testimony was “pivotal” in proving its case, and therefore, if error, it was not “harmless error.” Defendant argues that removal of
the experts’ testimony from this case would have left the jury pondering whether it was believable that eight men would engage in sexual intercourse every night of the week for forty-five days with a girl who was naturally protected from such gross behavior. [Even] [t]he trial judge labeled it an “incredible” story.
“The credibility of witnesses and weighing the evidence is for the jury[,]” State v. Myers, 88 S.D. 378, 381 , 220 N.W.2d 535, 537 (1974); accord Logue, supra; United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907 (9th Cir.1973), cert, denied, 416 U.S. 959 , 94 S.Ct. 1976 , 40 L.Ed.2d 310 (1974), not for the experts. Therefore, I join the dissent of Justice Henderson.