finding that defendant was not denied a fair trial based upon improperly admitted hearsay testimony where the jury had already heard the substance of that testimony through another witness and therefore the improper testimony was cumulative
How later courts described this case
- finding that defendant was not denied a fair trial based upon improperly admitted hearsay testimony where the jury had already heard the substance of that testimony through another witness and therefore the improper testimony was cumulative
- holding that the trial court did not err in failing to appoint new counsel to represent the defendant on his pro se post-trial motion, which alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call certain alibi witnesses
- finding no error where the prosecutor argued that proof beyond a reasonable doubt “ ‘is a burden of proof that is met in courtrooms across this county and in this building each and every day’ ”
- observing that this court has repeatedly rejected attempts by defendants to specify nonstatutory mitigating factors at the aggravation-mitigation stage
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
There is no dispute that at the time of trial and sentencing, defendant was taking the medication Dilantin under medical direction. For the reasons set forth in my special concurrence in People v. Britz, 174 Ill. 2d 163 (1996), he was therefore entitled to a fitness hearing under section 104 — 21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104 — 21(a) (West 1992)). By its express terms, the version of the statute in effect here applies to any defendant who is taking medication under medical direction even where, as here, the medication is not psychotropic in nature. No principle of statutory construction supports a contrary conclusion.
In filing this dissent today, I am departing from my usual policy. When my colleagues and I disagree on a legal point, such as the construction of a statute, I normally write separately only in the first case that presents the issue. Once the court has issued its opinion on the disputed point, I consider it to be the law of the state, which I am thereafter obligated to apply even if I personally disagree with it. In this case, however, stare decisis must yield to more fundamental concerns. I simply cannot abide an interpretation of the law that deviates as wildly from settled principles of statutory construction as does the majority’s where, as here, a human being’s life is at stake. When the government distorts the law to justify the execution of a defendant, its moral authority is lost and I will not be a party to it. I was elected to this office to be a judge, not a vigilante.
The judgment of the circuit court should be reversed and the cause should be remanded in accordance with People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450 (1994). Accordingly, I dissent.