holding that “in the exercise of our supervisory power to insure the fair administration of justice, ... all custodial interrogation including any information about rights, any waiver of those rights, and all questioning shall be electronically recorded where feasible and must be recorded when questioning occurs at a place of detention”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “in the exercise of our supervisory power to insure the fair administration of justice, ... all custodial interrogation including any information about rights, any waiver of those rights, and all questioning shall be electronically recorded where feasible and must be recorded when questioning occurs at a place of detention”
- recognizing that trial courts “consistently credit the recollections of police officers regarding the events that take place in an unrecorded interview” and that “[a] recording requirement . . . will reduce the number of disputes over the validity of Miranda warnings and the voluntariness of purported waivers”
- requiring custodial interrogations conducted at the police station to be recorded in their entirety based in part on the rationale that many factual disputes regarding the denial of a defendant's constitutional rights would be avoided if the conversations between the police and an accused suspect were recorded
- stating that “suppression will be required of any statements obtained in violation of the recording requirement if the violation is deemed ‘substantial’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TOMLJANOVICH, Justice
(concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority that the conviction in this ease be affirmed; however, I vigorously dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion holding that an unexcused failure to electronically record a statement during custodial interrogation must result in a suppression of that statement.
Custodial interrogations need not be recorded to satisfy the due process requirements of the United States Constitution relating to the preservation of evidence, as *594 established in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); see Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985). Moreover, as the majority indicates, of all the states that have addressed this issue, only the Alaska Supreme Court has held that the unexcused failure to record a statement during custodial interrogation must result in suppression of the statement. 1 I am unwilling at this time to depart from the rule of the vast majority of courts in this country.
While the recording of statements is desirable in many respects, I am not persuaded that recording is essential to the adequate protection of the accused’s right to a fair trial. I am especially reluctant to assume in the absence of any evidence that trial and appellate courts “consistently credit the recollections of police officers,” slip opinion at 7, and thereby routinely abandon their obligation to fairly assess the credibility of witnesses.
An exclusionary rule is a drastic remedy. I believe such a drastic remedy should be applied only after a full hearing of all the policy implications and with adequate notice to law enforcement. See State v. Spurgeon, 63 Wash.App. 503 , 820 P.2d 960, 963 (1991). This is particularly true where a right is not found to be rooted in the state constitution.
I would recommend the matter be referred to the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure for further consideration.
. The Alaska Supreme Court did not rely on its supervisory powers but held that an exclusionary rule was necessary to protect a suspect's right to due process under the Alaska Constitution.