The opinion
Taylor, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I join Judge Fitzgerald’s substantive due process analysis without any reservations. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s interpretation of the title-object clause, Const 1963, art 4, § 24. The assistance to suicide act (the Act), 1992 PA 270 , as amended by 1993 PA 3 , MCL 752.1021 et seq.; MSA 28.547(121) et seq., does not violate this constitutional provision.
At the outset, I would call attention to the well-established maxims of judicial review applicable in cases where constitutional challenges are brought against legislative enactments:
A statute will be presumed to be constitutional by the courts unless the contrary clearly appears; and in case of doubt every possible presumption not clearly inconsistent with the language and the subject matter is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of legislation. . . . Every reasonable presumption or intendment must be indulged in favor of the validity of an act, and it is only when invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution that a court will refuse to sustain its validity. A statute is presumed to be constitutional and it will not be declared unconstitutional unless clearly so, or so beyond a reasonable doubt. [Rohan v Detroit Racing Ass’n, 314 Mich 326, 341-342 ; 22 NW2d 433 (1946).]
Construing identical language over a century *224 ago, our Supreme Court explained the purpose of the title-object clause as follows:
The history and purpose of this constitutional provision are too well understood to require any elucidation at our hands. The practice of bringing together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature, and having no necessary connection, with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all, and thus secure the passage of several measures, no one of which could succeed upon its own merits, was one both corruptive of the legislator and dangerous to the state. It was scarcely more so, however, than another practice, also intended to be remedied by this provision, by which, through dexterous management, clauses were inserted in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and their passage secured through legislative bodies whose members were not generally aware of their intention and effect. There was no design by this clause to embarrass legislation by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation, and thus multiplying their number; but the framers of the constitution meant to put an end to legislation of the vicious character referred to, which was little less than a fraud upon the public, and to require that in every case the proposed measure should stand upon its own merits, and that the legislature should be fairly notified of its design when required to pass upon it. [People v Mahaney, 13 Mich 481, 494-495 (1865).]
In finding the Act violative of art 4, § 24, the lower court opinions, as well as the majority here, emphasize that this clause is intended to prevent the combination in one bill of legislative goals or objects "having no necessary connection.” The majority concludes that the Act contains two objects — study of possible legislative action concerning assisted suicide and the criminalization of assisted suicide — and that these objects have no *225 necessary connection. This confuses the object of the Act with the means utilized to accomplish that object. It also gives a crabbed reading to the phrase "no necessary connection,” depriving it of its intended meaning by taking it out of its context in the Mahaney case.
The majority argues that the statute has one subject, but two objects. That is, at best, to put too fine a point on things. Our Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he 'object’ of a law is its general purpose or aim.” Livonia v Dep’t of Social Services, 423 Mich 466, 497 ; 378 NW2d 402 (1985). Furthermore,
[t]o require that every end and means necessary to the accomplishment of this general object should be provided for by a separate act relating to that alone, would not only be senseless, but would actually render legislation impossible. [Mahaney, supra at 495 .]
The majority would hold that if they can plausibly posit the existence of two "objects,” then these "objects” have no necessary connection. This is contrary to the meaning of the phrase as used by the Mahaney Court. More importantly, it confuses the means used to accomplish a general object with the object itself.
Our Supreme Court "has long and consistently said that art 4, § 24, and similar 'one object’ provisions in earlier constitutions, are to be construed reasonably 'and not in so narrow and technical a sense as unnecessarily to embarrass legislation.’ ” Kuhn v Dep’t of Treasury, 384 Mich 378, 387 ; 183 NW2d 796 (1971) (citations omitted). The majority refuses to acknowledge the import of this holding, even though citing it approvingly, by immersing itself in irrelevant procedural minutiae that does not pertain to the title-object analysis. The general *226 legislative intent as expressed in the Act is the only appropriate focus of a title-object inquiry. Simply stated, a court should endeavor to discern a unity of purpose and only when such cannot be found declare the Act invalid. To do otherwise is unnecessarily to embarrass legislation. The majority’s position runs contrary to the appropriate deference to the Legislature that has characterized judicial review in this state. Rohan, supra.
In the case at bar, it is unquestionable, I believe, that the general purpose or object of the Act is to formulate an appropriate legislative response to the issue of assisted suicide. That there would be different provisions carrying forward this aim not only is proper but is altogether routine and expected when the Legislature does its work.
The provisional criminalization of assisted suicide, while the Commission on Death and Dying took testimony and made recommendations regarding a long-term solution, was intended to allow the issue to be addressed in an atmosphere conducive to calm deliberation. This method of assisting the commission is consistent with the object of the legislation. The Act, therefore, "is confined to the means supposed to be important to the end indicated,” Mahaney, supra at 496 , and merely "authorize[s] the doing of all things which may fairly be regarded as in furtherance of the general object of the enactment.” Kent Co, ex rel Bd of Supervisors of Kent Co v Reed, 243 Mich 120, 123 ; 219 NW 656 (1928). The Act does not violate the title-object clause of art 4, § 24. 1 _
*227 Neither does the Act violate the change of purpose clause of art 4, § 24. 2 The clause states:
No bill shall be altered or amended on its passage through either house so as to change its original purpose as determined by its total content and not alone by its title.
A related provision (the "five-day rule”), found in Const 1963, art 4,' § 26, states:
No bill shall be passed or become a law at any regular session of the legislature until it has been printed or reproduced and in the possession of each house for at least five days.
In Anderson v Oakland Co Clerk, 419 Mich 313, 329-330 ; 353 NW2d 448 (1984), our Supreme Court, discussing the change of purpose clause and the five-day rule, stated:
These are not recent provisions. A long history underscores an intent through these requirements to preclude last-minute, hasty legislation and to provide notice to the public of legislation under consideration irrespective of legislative merit.
The five-day rule and the change of purpose provision were contained in the same article and section of the Constitution of 1908. Const 1908, art 5, § 22. It is clear that the function of the change of purpose provision, both in the Constitution of 1908 and as modified in the Constitution of 1963, is to fulfill the command of the five-day rule.
*228 The opponents of the statute assert that inclusion of the temporary criminalization provision violated the change of purpose clause. However, as I have earlier indicated, there was only one purpose served by all provisions, and thus there is no violation of the change of purpose clause of art 4, §24.
Furthermore, even if 1992 PA 270 violated the change of purpose clause, the - entire Act was amended and reenacted as 1993 PA 3 . An amendatory act by its nature supersedes its predecessor and replaces it. Lahti v Fosterling, 357 Mich 578, 587-588 ; 99 NW2d 490 (1959). Because 1993 PA 3 has at all times included both the criminalization and study commission provisions, and because 1993 PA 3 is the only relevant act, the change of purpose clause was not violated.
With regard to the five-day rule, the legislative history of the Act, recounted in the majority opinion, shows that the criminalization provision, in what became 1992 PA 270 , was added on November 24, 1992, more than five days before passage on December 3, 1992. Therefore, I would hold that 1992 PA 270 complied with the requirements of the five-day rule. The Senate bill that became 1993 PA 3 was introduced on January 26, 1993, at which time it contained the study provisions and the temporary criminalization provision. It was enacted on February 25, 1993. Accordingly, I would hold that 1993 PA 3 also complied with the five-day rule.
As noted at the outset, I concur with Judge Fitzgerald’s substantive due process analysis. However, I dissent with respect to Const 1963, art 4, § 24. I would reverse on that basis in Docket Nos. 164963 and 172399, and would affirm the analysis of art 4, § 24 in Docket No. 171056.
Although acknowledged as "certainly not controlling,” ante, at 203, the majority cites the opinions of counsel for the House Judiciary Committee and the House Legislative Service Bureau that the Act violates the title-object clause. The majority feels that such opinions buttress their conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional. To so hold requires that one assume that upon reading and considering the advice from their staff the members of the Legislature decided to act *227 in violation of their oaths to comply with the Constitution. This is an impermissible assumption. Rather, the assumption should be that, expressly alerted to a constitutional issue, they considered it and found that acting in the way they did was constitutional. Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Crunch) 137, 179-180 (1803).
Though not discussed in the majority opinion, I briefly discuss the issue of the change of purpose clause because it was decided in the three lower court opinions under review.