recognizing that questions of arbitrariness arose because there were “no existing standards or guidelines governing when a trial judge should permit litigation of ineffectiveness claims, or other collateral claims, on post-verdict review or should defer to review at the collateral stage”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that questions of arbitrariness arose because there were “no existing standards or guidelines governing when a trial judge should permit litigation of ineffectiveness claims, or other collateral claims, on post-verdict review or should defer to review at the collateral stage”
- holding that where trial evidence showed that individual had taken no part in the crimes for which the defendant was on trial the individual could not be considered an accomplice and, thus, was not entitled to corrupt and polluted source jury-instruction
- stating a petitioner “must prove that the strategy employed by trial counsel “was so unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have chosen that course of conduct” (citation omitted)
- finding that a statement is not considered hearsay if it is offered to explain the course of conduct of the police during an investigation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Chief Justice CAPPY,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion subject to similar concerns raised by Justice Castille in his concurring opinion regarding the scope of the “Bomar 1 exception” to this court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48 , 813 A.2d 726 (2002). I agree with Justice Castille that “we should examine more squarely the procedural question of whether and when criminal defendants ... should be afforded the post-verdict and direct appeal unitary review which occurred in Bomar.” Concurring Opinion at 715, 933 A.2d at 1030 (Castille, J.). My fear is that continued employment of the “Bomar exception” will eventually swallow the rule we announced in Grant governing the presentation of ineffectiveness claims.
. Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003).