Opinion

Commonwealth v. Allen

  • 278 Pa. Super. 501
  • 420 A.2d 653
  • 1980 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2777
Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Jun 20, 1980
Status
Published
Author
Voort
On the bench
Spaeth, Hoffman, Van Voort
Cited by
20 cases
Authority
More cited than 9.8%

deeming “done that which ought to have been done,” and reaching the merits of an appeal where trial court’s order had not been entered on the docket

How later courts described this case

  • deeming “done that which ought to have been done,” and reaching the merits of an appeal where trial court’s order had not been entered on the docket
  • court recognized that case could be remanded for parties to perfect the record or quashed without prejudice to the filing of a subsequent appeal once the trial court order had been reduced to judgment
  • where the trial court order from which the defendant appealed had not been entered on the trial court’s docket, declining to quash the appeal “[i]n the interest of judicial economy, [and] we shall exercise our power under Pa.R.A.P. 105(a
  • in which this court reached the merits of the appeal even though the lower court’s order had never been entered upon the docket

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

VAN der VOORT, Judge,

concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result reached in this case but I respectfully dissent from a portion of the text in the Opinion.

Said Opinion cites and discusses the case of Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 203-204 , 316 A.2d 77 (1974). Said Opinion quoting from Ingram states that “While such terms [murder or robbery] clearly connote some meaning to the layman, this meaning does not always embrace the basic legal element of the crime. If this were not the case, there would be no need for instructions to a jury on such points, for certainly, an average defendant cannot be presumed to understand more than an average juror ...” [Emphasis supplied].

*511 In my experience, an average defendant knows far more about the crime or crimes with which he is charged than does the average juror. He has a trained expert lawyer to explain to him the nature and elements of said crime or crimes. He can counsel with His expert counsel and ask him questions about the offenses with which he is confronted. He can discuss any part of his case with his skilled counsel. Prior to the trial judge’s charge, the average juror on the other hand has no expert with whom he can consult nor does he have anyone skilled in the legal field whom he may question and from whom he can receive guidelines as to the nature of and elements of the crime or crimes the juror is considering. 1 The defendant knows what penalties may be imposed for his crimes should he be found guilty; the average juror does not know that. I think it is a fallacy to state that “an average defendant cannot be presumed to understand more than an average juror.” I do not like to see our Court giving imprimatur to such an inaccurate statement.

For these reasons I dissent to that part of the text in the majority opinion.

. The average juror is reluctant to question a trial judge about the legal points involved in a case.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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